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Résumé
Les entreprises et les particuliers ont de plus en plus besoin d’espace de stockage
et de puissance de calcul. C’est la raison pour laquelle plusieurs technologies ont vu le
jour comme le cloud computing. Cette technologie fournit ses utilisateurs en espaces de
stockage et en puissances de calcul en fonction de leurs besoins d’une manière flexible
et personnalisée. Cependant, les données externalisées comme les photos, les emails, les
rapports des entreprises sont souvent sensibles et confidentiels. Donc, il est primordial
de protéger les données externalisées des attaques externes, ainsi que du serveur cloud
lui-même. C’est pourquoi, il est très recommandé de chiffrer les données sensibles avant
de les externaliser vers un serveur distant. Pour faire des recherches sur des données ex-
ternalisées, il n’est plus possible d’exploiter des moteurs de recherche traditionnels vu que
les données sont chiffrées. Par conséquent, plusieurs approches de recherche sur des don-
nées chiffrées du cloud computing ont été proposées dans la littérature. Trois principaux
axes de recherche sur des données chiffrées sont souvent étudiés dans la littérature. Le
premier axe consiste à assurer la sécurité de l’approche de recherche. En effet, le processus
de recherche doit être réalisé sans déchiffrer aucune donnée, et sans causer aucune fuite
information sensible. Le deuxième axe correspond à la performance de la recherche. En
effet, un index chiffré est moins efficace qu’un index en clair, ce qui rend la recherche sur
des données chiffrées moins rapide, parfois très lente. Donc, il est important de trouver
un bon compromis entre sécurité et performance. Enfin, le troisième axe de recherche
correspond à la qualité des résultats retournés en termes de rappel et de précision. Le
problème est que le chiffrement de l’index a un effet négatif sur le rappel et la précision de
recherche. Donc, le but est de proposer des techniques qui permettent d’obtenir quasi les
mêmes résultats que ceux obtenus par un moteur de recherche traditionnel. Notre thèse
a fait l’objet de trois contributions majeures.
Recherche d’information conceptuelle sur des données chiffrées. Le but de
cette contribution est d’améliorer la qualité des résultats en termes de rappel et de préci-
sion. Pour cela, nous avons proposé une adaptation de la recherche d’information séman-
tique pour un environnement chiffré.
Recherche d’information accélérée sur des données chiffrées. Cette contribu-
tion consiste à améliorer la performance en termes de temps de recherche. Pour cela, nous
avons proposé 4 techniques qui exploitent des moyens de calcul parallèle comme le GPU
et le cluster. Cette solution a permis d’atteindre une accélération de 46.
Recherche d’information sur des données chiffrées avec prise en considéra-
tion des droits d’accès. L’objectif de cette contribution est de résoudre les problèmes
des approches basées sur le modèle vectoriel en proposant une nouvelle construction d’un
index inversé sécurisé. Cet index sécurisé a été re-exploité pour mettre en place une poli-
tique de contrôle d’accès aux données.
Mots clés. Recherche d’information chiffrée, cloud computing, recherche sémantique,
formule de pondération, chiffrement homomorphe, confidentialité des données.
Abstract
Companies and individuals demand more and more storage space and
computing power. For this purpose, several new technologies have
been designed and implemented, such as the cloud computing. This
technology provides its users with storage space and computing power
according to their needs in a flexible and personalized way. How-
ever, the outsourced data such as emails, electronic health records,
and company reports are sensitive and confidential. Therefore, It is
primordial to protect the outsourced data against possible external
attacks and the cloud server itself. That is why it is highly recom-
mended to encrypt the sensitive data before being outsourced to a
remote server. To perform searches over outsourced data, it is no
longer possible to exploit traditional search engines given that these
data are encrypted. Consequently, lots of searchable encryption (SE)
schemes have been proposed in the literature. Three major research
axes of searchable encryption area have been studied in the literature.
The first axis consists in ensuring the security of the search approach.
Indeed, the search process should be performed without decryption
any data and without causing any sensitive information leakage. The
second axis consists in studying the search performance. In fact, the
encrypted indexes are less efficient than the plaintext indexes, which
makes the searchable encryption schemes very slow in practice. More
the approach is secure, less it is efficient, thus, the challenge consists
in finding the best compromise between security and performance.
Finally, the third research axis consists in the quality of the returned
results in terms of relevance and recall. The problem is that the en-
cryption of the index causes the degradation of the recall and the
precision. Therefore, the goal is to propose a technique that is able
to obtain almost the same result obtained in the traditional search.
Three major contributions are proposed in our thesis.
1. Concept-based Semantic Search over Encrypted Cloud
Data. The aim of this contribution is to improve the quality of
the search result in terms of recall and precision. For this, we
propose an adaptation of the semantic search for an encrypted
environment [1].
2. Accelerated search over encrypted cloud data. This con-
tribution consists in improving the scheme performance in terms
of search time. For this, we propose 4 techniques that exploit
high performance computing (HPC) architectures, such as a GPU
and a cluster. This solution achieves an acceleration of 46x [2].
3. Secure Inverted Index Based Search over Encrypted Cloud
Data with User Access Rights Management. The aim of
this contribution is to solve the problems of the approaches based
on the vector space model by proposing a new construction of a
secure inverted index. This secure index is also used to set up a
data access control policy [3].
Keywords. Searchable encryption, cloud computing, semantic search,
homomorphic encryption, data confidentiality, weighting formula.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Context of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Information Retrieval 7
2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Basic IR Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 IR Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 Indexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1.1 Tokenization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1.2 Dropping Stop Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1.3 Stemming and Lemmatization . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1.4 Term Weighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1.5 Index Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3 Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.4 Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 IR Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
v
CONTENTS
2.4.1 Boolean Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2 Vector Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.3 Language Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 IR Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Semantic IR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6.1 Basic Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.1.1 Term, Concept, and Object . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6.1.2 What is Concept Based IR . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6.2 Concept Based Information Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.6.2.1 Concept Based IR Guided by Wikipedia . . . . . 20
2.6.2.2 Concept Based IR Guided by WordNet . . . . . . 21
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Cloud Computing 23
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Essential Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Service Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.5 Security Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Searchable Encryption 30
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2 General Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Security in Searchable Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.1 Threat Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.2 Security Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3.3 Security Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
vi
CONTENTS
4.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.1 Single Keyword SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.2 Multi Keyword (Ranked) SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.3 Fuzzy Keyword SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.4 Semantic SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.5 Dynamic SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4.6 Multi-Owner Based SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.7 SE with Access Right Managements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.8 Parallel and Efficient SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.4.9 Verifiable SE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 Cryptographic Tools 46
5.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 Secure k-NN Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.3 Attribute Based Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.4 Homomorphic Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.4.1 Paillier Cryptosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.4.2 Ideal Lattice Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption . . . . 53
5.4.3 Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers . . . . . 53
5.4.4 Homomorphic Encryption from Learning with Errors . . . 55
5.4.5 Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6 Concept Based Semantic Searchable Encryption 59
6.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.2 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2.1 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vii
CONTENTS
6.2.2 Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.2.3 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.3 Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.3.1 Wikipedia as Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3.2 Double Score Weighting Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.3.3 Semantic Searchable Encryption Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.4 Result and Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7 Accelerated Searchable Encryption 75
7.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.2.1 Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2.2 Computer cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.3 Problem formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.3.1 Huge Number of Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
7.3.2 Huge Number of Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.4 Proposed Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.4.2 Functions to Accelerate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.4.3 The proposed Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.4.3.1 Multi-Core Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.4.3.2 GPU Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.4.3.3 Hybrid Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.4.3.4 Cluster Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.5 Results and comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.5.1 Sequential Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.5.2 Multi-core Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
viii
CONTENTS
7.5.3 GPU Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.5.4 Hybrid Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.5.5 Cluster Based Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.5.6 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
8 Searchable Encryption with User Access Rights Management 100
8.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.2 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.2.1 Index Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.2.2 User Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
8.3 Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
8.3.1 Overview of the Proposed Approach (SIIS) . . . . . . . . . 107
8.3.2 Construction of a Secure Inverted Index . . . . . . . . . . 108
8.3.2.1 Homomorphic Encryption to Encrypt the Index . 108
8.3.2.2 Compressed Table of Encrypted Scores . . . . . . 109
8.3.2.3 Dummy Documents Technique . . . . . . . . . . 112
8.3.2.4 Double Score Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
8.3.3 User Access Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.3.3.1 CP-ABE to Encrypt the Data . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8.3.3.2 Use of a Second Secure Inverted Index . . . . . . 116
8.3.4 Access Pattern Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.3.4.1 Separating Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
8.3.4.2 Splitting Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.3.4.3 Scrambling Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.3.4.4 Grouping Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.3.4.5 Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
8.3.5 Functions of the SIIS Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
ix
CONTENTS
8.4 Analyses and Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.4.1 Security Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.4.2 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.4.2.1 Size of the Encrypted Index . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.4.2.2 Relevance of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.4.2.3 Search Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
9 Conclusions 147
9.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
9.2 Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
References 165
x
List of Figures
2.1 Information retrieval process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Information retrieval models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Accuracy and recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 The drawbacks of the keyword based search . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Semiotic triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Cloud computing layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Hybrid cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.1 General SE architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1 Example of an arithmetic circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1 General Architecture of SSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2 Wikipedia ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3 Comparison between 3 different approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.4 Comparison between 3 approaches when applying a filter . . . . . 74
7.1 Memory hierarchy in a GPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2 Results of experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.3 Results of experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.4 Multi-core based solution, experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
7.5 Hybrid solution, experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.6 Hybrid solution, experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.7 Cluster based solution, experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.8 Cluster based solution, experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1 General architecture of SIIS approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.2 The compressed table of encrypted scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3 The separating technique: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.4 The splitting technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
8.5 The scrambling technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.6 The index size when using homomorphic encryption . . . . . . . . 137
8.7 The index size when using the compressed table technique . . . . 138
8.8 The index size in the MRSE appraoch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.9 The relevance of results in three different approaches . . . . . . . 140
8.10 The dummy documents technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.11 The double score formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
8.12 The search time in the MRSE approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.13 The search time in the proposed approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.14 The search time when considering the user access rights . . . . . . 145
xii
List of Tables
6.1 Two sample documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2 Top 10 concepts when applying TFIDF formula . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.3 Top 10 concepts of terms, "Estonia" and "economy" . . . . . . . . 66
6.4 Top 10 concepts when applying DSW formula (example 1) . . . . 69
6.5 Top 10 concepts when applying DSW formula (example 2) . . . . 69
7.1 Comparison between three HPC architectures . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.2 Results of experiment 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.3 Results of experiment 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
8.1 The correspondence table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.2 The table of blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.3 The table of versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.4 The grouping table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Nowadays, companies and individuals demand more and more storage space for
their data, and computing power for their applications. For this purpose, several
new technologies have been designed and implemented, such as the cloud com-
puting. The latter provides its users with storage space and computing power
according to their needs in a flexible and personalized way. However, the out-
sourced data such as emails, health records, and company reports are sensitive and
confidential. Therefore, It is primordial to protect the outsourced data against
possible external attacks and the cloud server itself. For this reason, it is highly
recommended to encrypt the sensitive data before being outsourced to a remote
server.
To perform a search over these data, it is no longer possible to exploit tradi-
tional search engines given that the outsourced data are encrypted. Consequently,
lots of searchable encryption (SE) schemes have been proposed in the literature
[4; 5; 6; 7]. The common point between these approaches is that the data owner
starts by encrypting the data collection and the generated index before outsourc-
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ing them into the cloud. Upon receiving a trapdoor (encrypted query), the cloud
server performs a search through the encrypted index in order to retrieve and
return a list of top-k documents to the user. Furthermore, the search process
should be performed without decrypting any data and without causing any sen-
sitive information leakage.
1.2 Context of the Study
The first work [8] that has been proposed for SE in the literature only support
single keyword search which is performed directly on the encrypted data without
using any index. However, the encryption of data and queries is deterministic
which reduces the security of the scheme. After that, several works [5; 9; 10] have
proposed SE schemes based on different kinds of secure index structures (binary
tree, vector representation, inverted index) which are encrypted in different ways.
A secure index allows to improve the search performance, and the security of the
scheme since the data collection is no longer exploited during the search process
(the encrypted index is used instead).
Three major research axes of searchable encryption area have been studied in
the literature. The first axis consists in ensuring the security of the search ap-
proach. Indeed, the data collections, the indexes, and the users’ queries should be
encrypted in an effective manner (not necessarily in the same way). In addition,
the search process should not leak any sensitive information about the content of
documents and queries. The second axis consists in studying the search perfor-
mance. In fact, the encrypted indexes are less efficient to process than the indexes
in clear, which makes the searchable encryption schemes very slow in practice.
Generally, more the approach is secure, less it is efficient. Therefore, the chal-
lenge consists in finding the best compromise between security and performance.
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Finally, the third research axis consists in the quality of the returned results in
terms of relevance and recall. The problem is that the encryption of the index
causes the degradation of the recall and the precision. Therefore, the goal is to
propose a technique that is able to obtain almost the same result obtained by the
search through an unencrypted index.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
In this thesis, we deal with the three research axes of the searchable encryption
area. Our first contribution consists in proposing an approach that allows to
improve the quality of the search result in terms of recall and precision. The
proposed approach allows adapting the concept-based search to deal with en-
crypted data. For this purpose, we build from Wikipedia an ontology which is
responsible for the mapping operation between terms and concepts in order to
provide a search which is based on the meaning of documents and queries. Then,
we propose a new weighting formula that enables to perform a concept-based
search through an encrypted index, this new formula is called the double score
weighting (DSW) formula. The conducted experimental study shows that our
proposed scheme brings 60% of improvement compared to one of the most cited
approaches in the literature [5].
Our second contribution consists in reducing the search time when the vec-
tor space model is applied. This model is the most exploited in the searchable
encryption area for security reasons. However, an approach that is based on the
vector model is a time consuming process, which makes it impractical. In fact, in
the vector space model, each document and query is represented by an encrypted
vector1 of size equal to the total number of terms belonging to the data collection.
1The SKNN method is used to encrypt the vectors.
3
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
During the search process, the query vector should be compared (by calculating
the similarity1 scores) with each document of the data collection. Unfortunately,
this makes the search process very slow as demonstrated by our experimental
study (it may last for hours). To overcome this problem, we propose 4 solutions,
where each of them exploits a different high performance computing (HPC) ar-
chitecture (multi-core processor, GPU, computer cluster). Each solution is able
to deal with several queries at the same time (which means that multiple searches
can be performed simultaneously). Furthermore, the similarity scores between a
set of documents and a received query are calculated in a parallel way (which
means that even one search operation is performed in a parallel manner). Our
experimental study shows that the proposed solution can reach an acceleration
around a factor of 46.
Our third contribution consists in solving the problems of the SE schemes
that are based on the vector model, namely, their inefficiency in practice, and
their inability of updating the encrypted indexes. These problems are even more
pronounced, since, for security reasons, the vector space model is the most ex-
ploited in the searchable encryption area. Therefore, to solve these problems we
propose a new construction of a secure inverted index, which provides the most
appropriate and efficient way to perform a search. Our solution consists in build-
ing a secure inverted index from an unencrypted inverted index by using two
techniques, namely, homomorphic encryption, and the dummy documents tech-
nique. Homomorphic encryption is used to encrypt the scores within the index,
whereas, the dummy documents technique consists in adding random document
IDs to each entry of the index to hide the relationship between documents and
concepts (each entry of the index corresponds to a concept that points to a set
of documents in which it belongs). Nevertheless, these two techniques present
1The similarity score corresponds to the scalar product between the document vector and
the query vector.
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two major problems. First, homomorphic encryption has the disadvantage of
generating encrypted indexes which are three orders of magnitude larger than
the original ones. The second problem is that lots of false positives are returned
with the search results because of the dummy documents technique which de-
creases the accuracy. To solve the first problem, we propose a new technique
that allows to compress the secure inverted index. The experimental study shows
that this technique allows to decrease the size of the secure index from 161.45
TB to 712.54 GB. Then, to solve the second problem, we propose a similarity
computation formula that we call the double score formula. The latter allows
to increase the accuracy from 22.45% to 38.76%. Then, in order to establish a
data access control policy, we exploit a second secure inverted index whose entries
correspond to the users’ IDs, and each entry leads to the documents accessible
by the user corresponding to that entry, in addition to some dummy documents.
During the search process, the second index is used to narrow the search space
by selecting only documents that the user has the right to access, and the first
index is exploited to retrieve the relevant result.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we start by pre-
senting the basic notions of classical information retrieval (IR), with particular
focus on the IR process, the IR models, and the semantic IR. In chapter 3, we
briefly present the basic notions of cloud computing, namely, the essential char-
acteristics, the service models, and the deployment models. Then, we discuss
some important security aspects of cloud computing. In the following chapter,
we introduce the searchable encryption area. Specifically, we explain the gen-
eral architecture of a SE scheme, the security notions, and a detailed state of
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the art. In chapter 5, we present different cryptographic methods that are often
exploited in the SE area. Particularly, we present the SKNN method which is
very robust to encrypt vectors. Then, we present the CP-ABE method which
allows establishing a data access policy. Finally, we present different variants of
homomorphic encryption. In chapter 6, we present our first contribution which
consists in proposing a semantic search approach on encrypted cloud data. In the
following chapter, we present our second contribution that consists in proposing
four different techniques that allow to speed up the search process around a factor
of 46. Finally, our third contribution is presented in chapter 8. In this contri-
bution we propose a new construction of a secure inverted index that allows to
perform searches in an appropriate and effective way, and to implement an access
control policy over encrypted data. We conclude in chapter 9 by presenting a
summary of this thesis and discussing our perspectives.
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Chapter 2
Information Retrieval
2.1 Motivation
The recent advancements of data storage technology, the emergence of cloud
computing, and the evolution of computer networks have allowed considerable
amounts of data to be stored by users and organizations. This evolution has
challenged the information retrieval (IR) community to optimize the indexing
and search processes by proposing new models more elaborate [11].
An information retrieval system (IRS) is an interface between a user and a
data collection. Its purpose is to return to the user the most relevant documents in
response to a query in an acceptable time frame. For this purpose, two processes
must be implemented, namely, the indexing process and the matching process.
The indexing process consists in constructing a representation of documents
and queries that allows to optimize the search process time, whereas, the matching
process consists in calculating the similarity scores between documents and a
query in order to find and sort the most relevant documents.
We present in this chapter the basics of information retrieval. For this, we
start by explaining the IR process. Then, we introduce some IR models. After
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that, we describe the metrics used to the evaluation of an IRS. Finally, we talk
about the semantic IR.
2.2 Basic IR Concepts
The information retrieval (IR) is a set of processes, models, and techniques that
can be used to select from a data collection, the documents that are considered
relevant to a query sent by a data user.
Several important concepts revolve around this definition [12].
• Data collection. It corresponds to the set of all documents accessible by the
IRS.
• Document. It is the basic information in a data collection. It can be stored
in different formats.
• Query. It corresponds to the expression of the user’s need. A query is the
intermediary between the data user and the IRS. It can be expressed by a
Boolean expression, natural language, or a graphic.
• Relevance. It represents the association degree between a given document
and a query.
2.3 IR Process
The purpose of the IR process is to deal with the user’s need expressed by a
query. For this, a set of ranked documents deemed relevant by the IRS should
be returned to the user. Figure 2.1 shows that an IR process is composed of
several tasks, such as the indexing, the query processing, the matching, and the
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Figure 2.1: Information retrieval process
ranking. Other tasks such as the query reformulation and the index update may
be included in the IR process [13].
2.3.1 Indexing
The goal of the indexing process is to reduce the time needed to perform a search
operation. For this purpose, each document should have a descriptor that contains
the most important keywords of the document with associated weights. The
indexing process consists of five basic steps: tokenization, dropping stop words,
lemmatization, term weighting, and index creation [14].
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2.3.1.1 Tokenization
It consists in the construction of a list of all terms of a document. For this,
the spaces, the punctuation, and possibly the numbers should be recognized and
ignored [15].
2.3.1.2 Dropping Stop Words
The stop words are the terms of a document that are used to present a subject.
They are non-thematic words, such as "because" and "through". The stop words
can also be personal pronouns, prepositions, etc.
This step consists in dropping all the stop words belonging to a document.
For that, a list that contains the set of stop words should be used. This list is
called anti-dictionary [16].
2.3.1.3 Stemming and Lemmatization
In the same document, we may encounter a term represented in different forms
and having very similar meanings, such as "develop", "develops", and "devel-
oper". In order to reduce the size of the index and improve the recall, the terms
are replaced by their roots during the indexing process [17].
2.3.1.4 Term Weighting
It is one of the most important functions of the indexing process. It consists in
assigning a score to each term of a document. Most of the formulas that have been
proposed in the literature are based on two factors, namely, the term frequency
(TF) and the inverse of document frequency (IDF) [18]. The first one reflects
the importance of a term in a document, whereas, the second one represents the
importance of a term in a data collection. The combination of these two factors
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gives a good approximation of the importance of a term in a document of a data
collection.
2.3.1.5 Index Creation
In order to optimize the search time, it is essential to save the information pre-
viously collected in a particular storage structure. Several structures have been
proposed in the literature, such as the inverted index, the suffix tree, and the
signature file [12].
The inverted index is the most exploited storage structure in the literature.
It is composed of a set of entries, where each entry corresponds to a term in the
data collection. Each entry leads to a set of documents that contain the term
corresponding to that entry [19].
2.3.2 Query Processing
When a data user formulates his information need under a query, some processing
should be made in the same way as the indexing process. For this purpose, the
tokenization, the stop words deletion, the lemmatization, and the term weighting
tasks should be applied to the user query [20].
As the index, the user’s query can have different structures. The simplest one
which is adapted to the inverted index consists in a set of couples (term, weight).
For instance, the query "what is the biggest country" can be represented by the
following structure after processing {(big, w1), (country, w2)} where w1 and w2
are the weights of the terms "big" and "country", respectively. These weights
depend on the applied weighting formula (see Section 2.3.1.4).
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2.3.3 Matching
This process consists in attributing a similarity score to each document of the
data collection (when using an inverted index, just the documents that contain
at least one query term are concerned, the others are ignored). These scores are
calculated by applying a specific formula that depends on the model utilized by
the IRS (see Section 2.4). The similarity score represents the relevant degree of
a document with respect to a user’s query [21].
2.3.4 Ranking
The relevant documents should be selected and sorted based on the similarity
scores which are attributed in the matching process. This step is missing in few
IR models, such as the Boolean model where a document is whether relevant or
not relevant. The ranking is a very important task because of its ability to place
the most relevant documents on the top of the search result (for instance, in the
first page). Current approaches try to exploit external knowledge bases in order
to appropriately sort the search result [22].
2.4 IR Models
An IR model is composed of two fundamental functions. The first one is the
representation of documents and queries which corresponds to the indexing and
the query processing steps of the IR process, whereas, the second function is
the document-query matching that corresponds to the matching and the ranking
steps of the IR process.
Several models have been proposed in the literature [12]. These models are
divided into three main categories, namely, the set theoretic models, the algebraic
models, and the probabilistic models (see Figure 2.2). In the following, one model
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Figure 2.2: Information retrieval models
is presented for each category, namely, the Boolean model, the vector model, and
the language model, respectively.
2.4.1 Boolean Model
It is the first IR model that has been proposed in the literature [12]. The Boolean
model has been used in the library management systems. In this model, a query
is represented as a Boolean expression and its terms are connected by the logical
connectors (∧, ∨ and ¬). The Boolean model considers that each document is
either relevant or non-relevant with regard to a given query. The correspondence
score (CS) between a document D and a query is calculated by the following
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formula.

CS(D, t) = 1 if t ∈ D; 0 otherwise
CS(D, qi ∧ qj) = 1 if CS(D, qi) = 1 and CS(D, qj) = 1; 0 otherwise
CS(D, qi ∨ qj) = 1 if CS(D, qi) = 1 or CS(D, qj) = 1; 0 otherwise
CS(D,¬qi) = 1 if CS(D, qi) = 0; 0 otherwise
(2.1)
Where t is a query term, qi and qj are Boolean expressions.
The advantage of the Boolean model is its simplicity and its ability to perform
a precise search for an experienced user. Its disadvantage is the missing of a term
weighting notion which arises an issue concerning the ranking of documents.
2.4.2 Vector Model
The vector model [23] is one of the most IR models that have been studied in
the literature. In this model, the queries and documents are represented in a n-
dimensional vector space, where n is the total number of the indexing terms. Each
document (or query) is represented by a vector of weighted terms. The search
process consists in finding the nearest document vectors to the query vector.
For this purpose, many similarity functions have been proposed in the literature,
such as the dot product, the Jaccard distance, and the cosine similarity [24]. The
similarity score between a document D and a query Q when using the dot product
is calculated as follows.
Sim(D,Q) =
n∑
i=1
di × qi (2.2)
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Where di (resp. qi) is the ieme dimension of the vector D (resp. Q), and n is the
dimension of the vector space.
Unlike the Boolean model, the vector model is able to rank the search result
based on the similarity measure. Its disadvantage is the independence of the
index terms which causes the reduction of the recall.
2.4.3 Language Model
The language model is a probabilistic model that consists in assigning a score
to each document during the search process by calculating the probability that
a user’s query is inferred from that document [25]. This model is based on the
assumption that the user formulates a query while thinking of few documents
that he needs. In the language model, each document is represented by a query
that has been inferred from that document. When receiving a query, a score is
assigned to each document. This score represents the similarity degree between
the received query and that inferred from the document. Finally, the results are
sorted according to these scores.
2.5 IR Evaluation
The evaluation of an IRS is a very important step, since it allows to validate the
proposed model by comparing it with other models that have been proposed in
the literature [12]. There are two main metrics that are usually used to evaluate
an IRS, namely, the recall and the accuracy. Moreover, other metrics can also be
exploited such as the index size, the search time, and the security1 of the scheme.
The accuracy (precision) of an IRS corresponds to its ability to reject the
irrelevant documents during the search process (see Figure 2.3). It is calculated
1The security of a scheme should be guaranteed when the index is outsourced to an external
server such as a cloud computing.
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Figure 2.3: Precision and recall [26]
by the following formula.
Accuracy =
true positives
true positives + false positives
(2.3)
Where "true positives" is the number of relevant documents that are retrieved
by the IRS, and "false positives" is the number of non-relevant documents that
are returned by the IRS
The recall of an IRS corresponds to its ability to retrieve the relevant docu-
ments for a given query (see Figure 2.3). It can be calculated as follows.
Recall =
true positives
true positives + false negatives
(2.4)
Where, "false negatives" is the number of relevant documents that are rejected
by the IRS.
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2.6 Semantic IR
Classical information retrieval systems perform a keyword based search. Indeed,
during the search process, when the IRS receives a query, it tries to find the
documents that contain the query terms. The keyword based search has two
major drawbacks. The first one is that the documents which do not have any
query terms are ignored even if they may be relevant. The second drawback is
that the sense of the queries is not taken into consideration even if certain terms
may have several meanings. The first drawback decreases the recall of the IRS,
whereas, the second one causes the reduction of the accuracy. To illustrate the
problem, let us take the example of Figure 2.4.
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If a user sends the query "Economy of England", the server will search for
the documents that contain the terms "Economy" and/or "England" in the data
collection. The server will ignore "Doc 1" because it does not contain any query
terms. Contrariwise, it will return the second document that contains the term
"England". Nevertheless, if we analyze the content of the two documents, we
notice that the first document is relevant, since its meaning is close to that of
the query, given that it talks about the London stock exchange which is strongly
related to the economy of England, contrary to "Doc 2" that talks about football
and hence is supposed to be non-relevant even if it has terms in common with
the query.
In order to solve the problem encountered in the syntactic search. The IR
community has turned to the use of external knowledge bases such as thesauri
and ontologies in order to understand the meaning of documents and queries
[27; 28; 29]. The goal is to improve the precision and the recall of the search by
returning documents that have a meaning close to that of the query rather than
relying on the syntax. This area of research is called concept based information
retrieval.
2.6.1 Basic Notions
In the following we give some important definitions.
2.6.1.1 Term, Concept, and Object
A concept is an idea (e.g., sport) grouping in the same category, objects that are
semantically close to each other (e.g., football, boxing, golf), whereas, a term is
a linguistic representation of a concept or an object. Figure 2.5 illustrates the
relationship between a term, an object, and a concept using a semiotic triangle
[30].
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Figure 2.5: Semiotic triangle
2.6.1.2 What is Concept Based IR
Concept based information retrieval is an alternative of classical IR where se-
mantic concepts are used to represent documents and queries instead of using
bags of terms during the indexing and matching processes. Its goal is to perform
a semantic search rather than relying on the syntax. For this purpose, an ex-
ternal knowledge base should be exploited in order to map between terms and
concepts. The exploited knowledge source and the mapping process differ from
one approach to another.
2.6.2 Concept Based Information Retrieval
Several kinds of concept based search approaches have been proposed in the
literature. Wikipedia ontology and WordNet are the most exploited knowledge
bases by those approaches.
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2.6.2.1 Concept Based IR Guided by Wikipedia
In these schemes, a Wikipedia ontology is exploited to map between terms and
documents. The construction of an ontology from Wikipedia1 can be performed
as follows [31].
1. Each Wikipedia page pi corresponds to a concept ci.
2. Each concept ci is represented by a vector of terms vi = {(t1, wi1), (t2, wi2), ...,
(tn, win)} extracted from the corresponding Wikipedia page. These terms
are weighted by applying TFIDF formula.
The weight wij of a term tj in the vector vi corresponds to the association
degree between the term tj and the concept ci.
3. In order to accelerate the mapping process, an inverted index Iwiki is con-
structed where each term ti is represented by a set of concepts v′i to which
it belongs, v′i = {(c1, si1), (c2, si2), ..., (cm, sim)}.
Where sij is the association score between the term tj and the concept ci.
4. The inverted index Iwiki = {v′1, v′2, v′3, ...,v′n} that is composed of the set of
concept vectors corresponds to the Wikipedia ontology.
Before calculating the similarity between a document and a query, each of
them should be represented by a vector of concepts as follows.
1. A vector of terms di = {(t1, w′i1), (t2, w′i2), ..., (tn, w′in)} is constructed for
each document and query using TFIDF formula. Note that w′ik corresponds
to the weight of a term tk in the document di
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page, Feb. 2019.
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2. From the vector di, a vector of concepts d′i = {(c1, s′i1), (c2, s′i2), ..., (cm, s′im)}
is calculated by mapping between terms and concepts through theWikipedia
ontology.
The score s′ij assigned to a concept cj of the vector d′i is calculated by the
following formula.
s′ij =
∑
tk∈di
w′ik.skj (2.5)
3. Finally, the similarity score between a document and a query is calculated
by applying the scalar product.
2.6.2.2 Concept Based IR Guided by WordNet
WordNet1 is a lexical database that represents English words in a semantic graph.
These words correspond to nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. The words
that have the same meaning (e.g., car and automobile) are grouped in the same
category called "synset". The synsets correspond to semantic concepts which
are related to other synsets by several relations, such as the "hyponymy" ("is a"
relation) and the "meronymy" ("part-whole" relation) [32].
Several search approaches have exploited WordNet to perform a concept based
search have been proposed in the literature [33; 34; 35]. "Varelas et al." proposed
an approach based on the vector model as follows [36].
1. First, Each document and query is represented by a vector of weighted
terms using TFIDF formula.
2. After that, the weight of each query term is adjusted based on the semantic
relationship with the other query terms. This allows to increase the weight
of the query terms that are semantically similar (e.g., "railway", "train",
1https://wordnet.princeton.edu/, Feb. 2019.
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"metro"), whereas, the weights of the non-similar terms remain unchanged
(e.g., "train", "phone").
3. Then, the query is expanded by the synonym of its terms. Hyponyms
(instances of a term) and hypernyms (generic terms) that are semantically
similar to the query terms are also added to the query. A weight is assigned
to each added term.
4. After expanding and re-weighting the query, the similarity is calculated
between each document of the data collection and the new query.
2.7 Summary
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the basic notions of information retrieval.
For this, we started by explaining the IR process which is composed of four main
tasks, namely, the indexing, the query processing, the matching, and the ranking.
An IR model indicates how the search process should be done. It is composed of
three main categories, which are the set theoretic models, the algebraic models,
and the probabilistic models. One model of each category is presented in this
chapter. After that, the IR evaluation metrics, which are the recall and precision
are briefly presented. Finally, the importance of the semantic search is shown
with particular focus on the concept based information retrieval.
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Cloud Computing
3.1 Motivation
Cloud computing is a technology that consists in providing users with storage
space and computing power through remote servers. This technology allows com-
panies and individuals to take advantage of IT resources (data, network, storage,
computing) as a service. According to the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [37], cloud computing is a model that enables on-demand
network access for authorized users to a shared pool of IT resources. These re-
sources which correspond to networks, servers, storage space, applications, pro-
cessing, and services, can be provided rapidly with minimal management and
interaction efforts. The cloud computing model is composed of five essential
characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.
We present in this chapter the different features of the cloud model. Then,
we discuss the security aspect in cloud computing.
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3.2 Essential Characteristics
In the following, we present the main characteristics of cloud computing that
have been defined by the NIST organization [37].
• On-demand self-service. Cloud’s customers are able to provision computing
resources, such as computing power, storage, networks, and software in a
flexible way without requiring any human interaction.
• Broad network access. It refers to the fact that customers can access cloud
resources using a wide range of devices, such as tablets, PCs, Macs, and
smartphones, as well as a wide range of locations.
• Resource pooling. The cloud computing model is a multi-tenant model,
which means that the cloud resources are shared between the different cus-
tomers with scalable services. The cloud resources are dynamically assigned
and reassigned based on the customer’s need.
• Rapid elasticity. It refers to the cloud ability to provide customers with
scalable services. The rapid elasticity allows clients to automatically obtain
additional resources when needed.
• Measured service. It refers to the ability of both customers and providers to
control, monitor, and report the cloud resources (e.g., storage, processing,
and bandwidth) in order to ensure a transparency of the utilized services.
3.3 Service Models
Three main service models are proposed by the cloud providers [37] (see Figure
3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Cloud computing layers
• Software as a Service (SaaS). In this model, the applications which are in-
stalled and running in the cloud side are provided to the consumers. The
letter can access these applications through web browsers or interface pro-
grams. The users don’t have to manage or control anything about the
network, the servers, the storage, the operating systems (OS), or even indi-
vidual application capabilities.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS). In this model, several tools such as the oper-
ating systems, the libraries, the programming languages, and the databases
are provided to the cloud’s consumers in order to develop and execute ap-
plications. The users don’t have to control the cloud infrastructure such as
the network, the servers, the storage, and the operating systems, but have
to manage the application deployment and the configuration setting.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In this model, several resources such as
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processing, storage space, and network are provided to the cloud’s users in
order to deploy and run their software (e.g., OS and applications). The
consumers have control over the OS, the storage space, the deployed appli-
cations, and a limited networking components (e.g., firewalls).
3.4 Deployment Models
In the following, we present the four main deployment models of clouds [37].
• Private cloud. It consists in a set of resources (e.g., servers, applications, and
processing) exclusively dedicated to a single organization. The maintenance
of the services is always performed through a private network.
• Community cloud. It consists in a set of resources and data shared between
several organizations (e.g., hospitals, and government organizations) that
have common interests. The cloud infrastructure may be managed by one
or more of the organizations, or by a third party.
• Public cloud. It consists in a set of resources provided to the general public.
In a public cloud, the hardware, the software, and all the infrastructure are
owned and managed by the cloud service provider.
• Hybrid cloud. It is a composition of two or more distinct private, public, and
community cloud in order to take advantage of all of them. For flexibility
purpose, an organization can move its data and applications between the
different cloud infrastructures (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Hybrid cloud [38]
3.5 Security Aspect
To secure an information system, it is important to identify the threats and chal-
lenges in order to implement the appropriate countermeasures. The architecture
and features of cloud computing bring some security benefits, such as the cen-
tralization of security. However, cloud computing introduces new aspects that
require risk assessment, such as the availability, confidentiality and privacy, and
data integrity [39].
• Confidentiality and Privacy. Data confidentiality consists in accessing data
only by authorized users. When using a cloud computing, the data would
be exposed to a great number of parties, devices, and applications, which
increases the vulnerability of those externalized data. On the other hand,
the data privacy corresponds to the user’s desire to control the disclosure
of his personal information. The cloud providers should be able to com-
ply with the international laws regarding the protection of the personal
data. In cloud computing, several users often share the same resources
(applications, memory, network, data). However, data sharing brings sev-
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eral confidentiality and privacy threats. These security aspects should be
carefully considered when building systems and hosting data.
Data confidentiality in cloud computing is strongly related to user authen-
tication. Therefore, to prevent unauthorized data access, a robust authen-
tication system should be implemented. Moreover, software confidentiality
is as important as confidentiality and privacy of data. Given that data and
applications are hosted in the cloud server side, a lack of software security
may lead to a vulnerability on data confidentiality. For this reason, it is
highly recommended to pay attention to the software security, and make
sure that no information is leaked when applications are run by the cloud.
• Integrity. It means that resources can only be modified by authorized users.
Therefore, data integrity is the protection of data against unauthorized
changes, deletions, and fabrications. The cloud provider should guarantee
that the externalized data are not modified, abused, or stolen. For this,
an authentication system should be implemented in order to determine for
each user his access rights to the secured resources.
Software integrity consists in protecting applications from unauthorized
modifications, deletions, fabrications, or thefts. The cloud providers im-
plement software interfaces that allow users to access and manage cloud
services. Therefore, the protection of software integrity is transferred to
the protection of these interfaces that are managed by the software owners
or administrators.
• Availability. It corresponds to the fact that resources are available and
usable upon demand by an authorized client. System availability means that
the system is always ready to operate even if some authorities misbehave.
The cloud provider must maintain the information and data processing
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available upon demand by an authorized user even if the number of clients
increases.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced some cloud computing concepts. For that, we
started by defining the five essential characteristics of cloud computing. Then,
we presented and clarified the difference between the three layers of cloud com-
puting (SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS). After that, we presented the four types of cloud
computing (public, private, community, and hybrid cloud). Finally, we discussed
the three important security aspects in the cloud, namely, confidentiality and
privacy, integrity, and availability.
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Chapter 4
Searchable Encryption
4.1 Motivation
Companies and individuals demand more and more storage space and computing
power for their applications. This need led to the development of new technologies
such as cloud computing. This technology enables outsourcing data in order to
be stored and processed remotely according to the users’ needs. In addition, users
pay only for the storage space and the computing power. Therefore, this model
is much more flexible and offers very good value for money (hardware, software,
and maintenance).
However, the outsourced data, such as photos, emails, financial documents,
and medical reports are often sensitive and confidential. Therefore, to protect
these datasets against possible attacks on the cloud system, it is highly recom-
mended to encrypt them before they are outsourced.
When a user performs a search over the outsourced and encrypted data, the
cloud server cannot use any standard search approaches since these data are
encrypted. To overcome this issue, many researchers have worked on this problem
by proposing approaches more or less effective and secure [4; 5; 8; 9; 40; 41; 42].
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We introduce in this chapter the searchable encryption area. For this, we
start by presenting the general architecture of a searchable encryption scheme.
Then, we introduce several notions of security in searchable encryption. Finally,
we present a detailed related work.
4.2 General Architecture
The search process in a cloud environment is different from traditional search
engines. This difference comes from the fact that the outsourced cloud data
are encrypted and the search process should not cause any sensitive information
leakage. The architecture of a searchable encryption (SE) scheme is composed
of three main entities, namely, the "data owner", the "cloud server" and the
"authorized users" (Figure 4.1).
The data owner is responsible for the creation of an index from the data
collection and encrypting both of them before outsourcing them to the cloud.
The index should be encrypted using an appropriate cryptosystem that keeps
the ability to make calculations on the index such as "homomorphic encryption"
[43] and the secure k nearest neighbor (SkNN) algorithm [44], whereas, the data
collection should be encrypted using a robust cryptosystem such as "AES". Then,
the encryption/decryption keys are shared by the data owner with each authorized
user using a secure communication protocol. To perform a search, an authorized
user formulates a query, encrypts it using the secret key, and sends the trapdoor
(the encrypted query) to the cloud server. Upon receipt of the trapdoor, the
server initiates the search process over the secure index and returns to the user
an encrypted result. Finally, the user decrypts the result and requests a set of
relevant documents from the server.
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Figure 4.1: General searchable encryption architecture
4.3 Security in Searchable Encryption
In this section, we present the threat models, the security constraints, and the
security definitions in searchable encryption.
4.3.1 Threat Models
The cloud server is considered "honest-but-curious" in most SE schemes proposed
in the literature. This means that the server is honest when applying the different
functions, but is curious to learn as much as possible about the content of the
data collection by doing statistical analyzes. Based on the information held by
the cloud server. The threat models are divided into two main categories. Each
category has different attack capabilities [5].
• Known ciphertext model. In this model, the cloud server is supposed to
only know the encrypted data collection and the secure index sent by the
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data owner, in addition to the trapdoors sent by the authorized users.
• Known background model. This model is stronger than the previous one.
In addition to the information that can be accessed in the known cipher-
text model, the server may hold some background knowledge that can be
exploited to perform statistical analyses, for instance, the probabilities of
term co-occurrence [45].
4.3.2 Security Constraints
When designing a searchable encryption scheme on cloud data, it is necessary to
take into account the security constraints elaborated in the literature [5; 6; 45;
46; 47].
• Keyword privacy. This constraint makes sure that the proposed scheme
is able to hide from the server the "term distribution" and the "inter-
distribution" of a document. The term distribution indicates the frequency
distribution of a given term in each document of the data collection, whereas,
the inter-distribution indicates the distribution of scores of terms in a given
document. Hiding these two features allows to prevent the server from
making any link between terms and documents.
• Search pattern. This constraint (also called "query unlinkability") guaran-
tees that the proposed scheme can prevent the server from deducing the
relationship between a given set of encrypted queries. For that, the cryp-
tosystem should be non-deterministic.
• Access pattern. This constraint guarantees that the proposed scheme is able
to hide from the server the sequence of results returned to a user during the
search.
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• Forward privacy. This constraint makes sure that the server cannot learn
that a new document contains keywords that have been searched for in
the past. For instance, if a user searched for the term w and later a new
document d containing the term w has been inserted in the data collection,
forward privacy constraint guarantees that the server cannot deduce that
the term w belongs to the document d.
• Backward privacy. This constraint guarantees that the server is not able to
perform searches on deleted documents.
4.3.3 Security Definitions
The first SE scheme proposed in the literature [8] does not use any notions of
security definition. Nevertheless, this scheme is indistinguishable against chosen
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). This means that an adversary A cannot distinguish
between two ciphertexts even if their corresponding plaintexts are chosen by that
adversary. However, this definition does not take into consideration the trapdoors
and the indexes which are the main source of leakage in searchable encryption.
Consequently, IND-CPA is not sufficient to prove the security of SE schemes [48].
The first security definition in the context of searchable encryption was pro-
posed by "Goh et al." who defined a semantic security against adaptive chosen
keyword attacks (IND1-CKA) which is suitable for indexes [49]. This security
definition guarantees that given two documents of equal size and an index, an
adversary A cannot decide which document corresponds to the index. Neverthe-
less, the trapdoors are not taken into consideration which makes IND1-CKA not
effective to prove the security in the context of SE.
"Chang and Mitzenmacher" introduced a new simulation based IND-CKA
which is a stronger version than IND1-CKA [50]. Their security definition takes
into consideration the trapdoors and makes sure that an adversary A cannot link a
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document to its index even for unequal size documents. Nevertheless, "Curtmola
et al." proved that this security definition is incorrect given that it can be satisfied
by an insecure SE scheme [51].
After that, "Goh et al." introduced IND2-CKA where an adversary A cannot
distinguish indexes from two unequal size documents as done by "Chang and
Mitzenmacher" [48]. However the trapdoors are still not secure and the server
may deduce terms from the received encrypted queries. This makes both IND1/2-
CKA weak security definitions in the context of searchable encryption.
"Curtmola et al." pointed out that the indexes and the trapdoors should be
secure in the context of SE [51]. They proposed two adversarial models that are
used as the standard security definitions for searchable encryption to date. The
first one (IND-CKA1) is a non-adaptive model, it guarantees the security of a
scheme only if all queries are sent at once, whereas, the second one (IND-CKA2)
which is an adaptive model guarantees the security even if a user query is based on
the prior search. Both IND-CKA1/2 guarantee that no information is leaked to
the server except the search pattern and access pattern. IND-CSK2 is considered
a strong security definition for SE schemes.
In the case of asymmetric SE, schemes do not guarantee the security of the
trapdoors given that they are encrypted using public keys. "Boneh et al." intro-
duced PK-CKA2 as security definition for asymmetric SE [52]. It guarantees that
an adversary A cannot distinguish between ciphertexts of two challenge keywords
even if it is able to get the ciphertext of any other keywords. PK-CKA2 makes
sure that no information about keywords are leaked until the trapdoor of that
word is available.
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4.4 Related Work
Many works on information retrieval over encrypted cloud data have been carried
out in the last few years. This section presents the major works that have been
published recently. We classify these works in 9 major categories according to
their contributions.
4.4.1 Single Keyword SE
"Raykova et al." proposed an anonymous searchable encryption scheme that ex-
ploits a trusted authority called "query router" [53]. The latter acts as an inter-
mediate between the clients who send the queries and the server which stores the
encrypted index. The query router has two major tasks. The first one consists in
checking and hiding the identity of the users, whereas, the second task consists in
re-encrypting the queries and the search results in order to be exploitable by the
server and the users, respectively. For efficiency purposes, the authors exploited
the bloom filter [54] and the deterministic encryption in the public key setting
proposed by " Bellare et al." [55].
"Boldyreva et al." proposed a SE scheme called ranked searchable symmetric
encryption (RSSE) [56]. An inverted index is exploited where its entries are
encrypted using a collision resistant hash function, and each entry points on
a list of couples (file id, score) encrypted by a pseudo-random function. Their
contribution consists in encrypting the scores using an order preserving symmetric
encryption (OPSE) in order to provide ranked results. In addition, to avoid more
information leakage than the access pattern and the search pattern, the authors
proposed a one-to-many1 OPSE instead of using the traditional one-to-one OPSE
[57].
1One-to-many OPSE guarantees that the encryption of the scores is non-deterministic.
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4.4.2 Multi Keyword (Ranked) SE
"Yu et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme called two-round searchable
encryption (TRSE) [41]. Their goal was to propose a scheme that solves the
problem of information leakage caused by statistical analyzes done on the cloud
server. Their technique consists in hiding from the server the similarity scores
between documents and queries by exploiting an encryption method called fully
homomorphic encryption over the integers (FHEI) [58]. However, this encryp-
tion method requires Ω(λ10) per-gate1 computation which makes TRSE scheme
inefficient in practice.
"Cao et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme called multi-keyword
ranked search over encrypted cloud data (MRSE) [5]. They have contributed to
the improvement of the SkNN algorithm [44] by adding dummy dimensions and
random parameters to the document and query vectors in order to protect the
data privacy.
"Elmehdwi et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme based on the
SkNN algorithm [59]. Their aim was to preserve the privacy of data and queries
and hide the data access pattern from the cloud server during the search process.
They exploited the "Paillier" cryptosystem [60] to encrypt the database and the
queries. Their proposed approach exploits two non-colluding semi-honest cloud
service providers, denoted by C1 and C2, where, the encrypted database is out-
sourced to C1, whereas, the secret key is stored in C2. In addition, C1 and C2
are exploited in order to perform other operations not supported by the Paillier
cryptosystem such as the "secure multiplication", the "secure minimum", and the
"secure bit-decomposition". Their approach is able to perform a search operation
over encrypted cloud data while hiding the data access pattern from both C1 and
C2. However, this approach is not applicable in large scale data because of its
1λ is a security parameter.
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poor performance.
"Wang et al." proposed a SE scheme that exploits an inverted index encrypted
using an asymmetric cryptosystem [61]. Their goal was to propose an efficient
scheme which is able to ensure the index privacy and hide the access pattern
and the search pattern from the server. The inverted index is composed of a
set of inverted lists of document IDs. Each inverted list is represented by a
polynomial whose coefficients are encrypted by the Paillier encryption algorithm.
This scheme guarantees the index privacy, and can hide the search pattern from
the server.
4.4.3 Fuzzy Keyword SE
"Li et al." proposed a fuzzy searchable encryption approach [62] that is based on
some techniques such as the edit distance [63] and the deterministic encryption.
It consists in grouping the keywords that have an edit distance (from each other)
less than a predefined threshold in the same category. The keywords of the
same set are related to each other in the index, and provide the same search
result. This approach allows to return a correct result even if the documents and
queries contain some spelling mistakes. To optimize the storage space and the
search performance, a wildcard-based technique was exploited. This technique
consists in representing the similar keywords as a regular expression rather than
enumerating them one by one.
"Wang et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme over encrypted cloud
data which takes into account the possible spelling mistakes in the queries [4].
Contrary to most of the fuzzy search schemes over encrypted cloud data proposed
in the literature which are based on the extension of the index, this scheme is
based on two techniques, namely, the locality sensitive hashing (LSH) technique
and the bloom filter. The bloom filter uses the LSH functions to represent terms
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which are syntactically close in the same representation, such as "network" and
"netword".
4.4.4 Semantic SE
"Sun et al." proposed a semantic searchable encryption scheme called ranked
semantic keyword search (RSS) [64]. The particularity of this scheme is that the
cloud server itself which is responsible for building the index and constructing a
semantic graph that is used to extend the trapdoor by adding synonyms of the
query terms. However, granting the server the task of building the index and
extending the queries may compromise the data privacy.
"Fu et al." proposed a stemming based searchable encryption scheme [65].
Their idea consists in grouping each set of words having the same root in the same
category (concept) by using the Porter stemming algorithm [66]. The search index
consists in a prefix tree where each node corresponds to a character and each path
from the root to a leaf corresponds to a term (root of the word). They used a
deterministic cryptosystem to encrypt the index and the queries. Unfortunately,
this SE scheme just exploits the root of terms without taking into account the
meaning of documents and queries. In addition, the deterministic encryption
makes the cloud server task easier when performing statistical analyses.
"Fu et al." proposed a concept based searchable encryption scheme [67]. They
exploited some techniques of natural language processing (NLP) such as "text
summarization" and "Tregex" to extract the most important sentences from doc-
uments in order to be converted into conceptual graphs (CGs). In addition, the
authors proposed a technique that maps each CG into vectors. The set of vectors
corresponds to the search index, which is encrypted using SkNN algorithm and
hash functions.
"Fu et al." proposed a concept based semantic search over encrypted cloud
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data [68]. Their approach exploits a concept hierarchy (e.g., WordNet) which is
extended by affecting attributes with associated values to the concepts (e.g., the
attribute "color" with the value "red" is affected to the concept "car"). Each
document and query is represented by two vectors, the first one is based on the
concepts and the second vector is based on the attributes. Furthermore, each
query is extended by candidate concepts that are similar to the concepts of that
query. The SkNN algorithm is used to encrypt the vectors and a binary tree is
proposed to accelerate the search process.
4.4.5 Dynamic SE
"Kamara et al." proposed a new searchable encryption scheme that takes into
account the dynamic aspect of data (adding and deleting files from the data
collection) [69]. Their construction is based on an inverted index in the form of a
chained list. Each node of the chained list corresponds to a term-file association.
The nodes that contain the same term are linked together. The chained list should
be reconstructed each time a file is added or deleted from the data collection.
The drawback of this dynamic SE scheme is that the ranking of results is not
considered, and the access pattern and search pattern are leaked.
"Hahn and Kerschbaum" proposed an information retrieval system on en-
crypted and dynamic cloud data [70]. Their construction is based on determin-
istic encryption of the index entries and the queries. The inverted index which
is empty at the beginning is built while searches are performed. When a key-
word1 is searched for the first time, it would be added to the inverted index as
an entry that leads to the documents in which that keyword belongs. When up-
dating the data collection, the index should also be updated by adding/deleting
the document IDs in the appropriate entries.
1The keyword is encrypted using a deterministic cryptosystem.
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"Xia et al." proposed a SE scheme that supports multi-term queries, and takes
into account the dynamic aspect of data [7]. Each document of the data collection
is represented by a vector encrypted using the SkNN algorithm. A binary tree T
is built to provide an efficient search. The leaves of T correspond to the document
vectors and the intermediate nodes are calculated according to the leaves. during
the search process, a scalar product is computed between the root and the query
vector. If the similarity score is positive, the search process recursively continues
on the child nodes until reaching the leaves. When updating a document d, the
sub-tree from the root to the leaf corresponding to d should be recalculated.
4.4.6 Multi-Owner Based SE
"Bao et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme in a multi-user setting [71].
The authorized users are able to insert encrypted data records in the outsourced
database, and each user can search on the whole records using his distinct secret
key. The user manager who is a trusted entity can dynamically enroll or revoke
any user without any need of updating the encrypted database or distributing
new secret keys.
"Rhee et al." proposed a public key searchable encryption in a multi-owner
environment [72]. The aim of their approach is to enhance the security model
proposed by "Baek et al." [73] by preventing the keyword-guessing attacks [74].
For that, they introduced the concept of "trapdoor indistinguishability" to their
public key SE scheme by adding a random variable to the trapdoor computation.
"Li et al." proposed an authorized keyword search over encrypted cloud data
[75]. Their scheme allows several data owners to encrypt and share data, while
enabling a large number of users to search over multiple owners’ data. For that,
a trusted authority and several local trusted authorities should be exploited to
determine the users’ search privileges. The hierarchical predicate encryption [76]
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was used to encrypt the index and the queries.
4.4.7 SE with Access Right Managements
"Zhao et al." proposed a fine-grained access control aware multi-user keyword
search scheme [77]. The search process is performed only on the subset of data
accessible by the user. The authors exploited an attribute based cryptosystem
[78] to apply an access control policy. In addition, the file update and the user
revocation are taken into consideration in this scheme.
"Bouabana-Tebibel and Kaci" proposed a searchable encryption approach on
cloud data [79] that takes into account the users access rights which is possible
due to the use of attribute based encryption methods [78; 80]. This approach
enables the cloud server to perform a search only on data that are accessible by
the user rather than searching on the whole data collection. For this purpose, an
authorized user has to include the encrypted private key in the trapdoor in order
to allow the server to check if the user has the right to access the document.
"Yuan et al." proposed an approach to search over encrypted images while
taking into account the users access rights to the data [81]. Their construction
is based on the SkNN algorithm where every image is represented by a vector.
To accelerate the search process, a tree index is constructed by classifying the
images into several groups using the k-means clustering algorithm. In addition,
the tree index stores the access right values in each tree node. A user is able to
perform a search via an encrypted query just in the parts of the tree where he
has the right to access.
"Deng et al." proposed a multi-user searchable encryption scheme with key-
word authorization in a cloud storage [82]. This scheme can handle multiple
data owners where each owner is able to construct his own data collection and
outsource it to the cloud server. Each private key contains some properties that
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indicate to the cloud server the set of terms that the user has the right to search
for. Furthermore, each data owner is able to grant or revoke any keyword autho-
rization to any user.
4.4.8 Parallel and Efficient SE
"Li et al." proposed a searchable encryption scheme called Johnson-Lindenstrauss
transform based scheme [6]. Their goal was to achieve high performance and low
cost search by reducing the index size. For that, they used a method called
Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform (J-L transform) [83]. The principle of the J-L
transform is that, if the points of a vector space are projected into a subspace
that is randomly selected and suitably sized, then, the Euclidean distance between
the points is approximately preserved. Therefore, each document and query is
represented in a new vector space with a much smaller number of dimensions
than the original one.
"Kamara and Papamanthou" proposed a parallel searchable encryption scheme
which is based on the keyword red black (KRB) tree [10]. This binary tree is use-
ful because it allows a keyword search by following paths from the root to the
leaves and a file update by following paths from the leaves to the root. This
scheme supports parallel keyword search as well as parallel addition and deletion
of files. The drawback of this scheme is that the search and access patterns are
leaked because of the deterministic encryption of the queries.
"Fu et al." proposed an SE approach that combines the vector space model
with a binary tree structure [84]. Each document of the data collection is en-
crypted using the SkNN algorithm. The index corresponds to a binary tree where
each node is encrypted using a static hash table. The authors proposed a parallel
search algorithm to efficiently browse through the binary tree.
"Xia et al." proposed an approach to search over encrypted images [85]. For
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that, they constructed an index of two layers in order to speed up the search pro-
cess. The first layer is a pre-filter table constructed by locality sensitive hashing
in order to classify the similar images in the same category. The pre-filter table
is used to discard the dissimilar images. The second layer is a one-one map index
that is used to sort the pertinent images by exploiting the SkNN algorithm.
4.4.9 Verifiable SE
"Van Liesdonk et al." proposed a keyword searchable encryption scheme over
dynamic data [86]. Their approach exploits an inverted index in which the entries
(keywords) are encrypted using a pseudo-random function and each entry points
on an index table decryptable using an appropriate trapdoor received from the
client. The authors proposed two versions of their approach. The first one is more
efficient, but the search should be made interactively with the client, whereas,
the second one does not need the client to be interactive. Both approaches are
proven IND-CKA2 secure.
"Bösch et al." proposed a selective document retrieval scheme over encrypted
data [87]. They combined the vector based index proposed by "Chang and
Mitzenmacher" [50] with the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme pro-
posed by "Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan" [88] to index the documents and
queries. During the search process, an encrypted similarity score is calculated
by applying the inner product between each document vector and query vector.
An additional round is needed in this scheme since the encrypted result should
be decrypted in the user side. The advantage of this scheme is its ability to
hide the search pattern from the server, but the search efficiency is not optimal
given that no inverted index or binary tree is exploited. This scheme is proven
fully secure under the assumption that the homomorphic encryption scheme is
IND-CPA secure.
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"Cash et al." developed a sublinear conjunctive search solution for arbitrarily
structured data [89]. Their solution exploits the inverted index structure proposed
by "Curtmola et al." [9]. Their contribution consists in adapting the conjunctive
search for large datasets. For this purpose, the search process starts with the
estimated least frequent keyword and then filtering the result by exploiting the
remaining query terms. Their solution is proven IND-CKA2 secure.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the basic notions of searchable encryption. The
general architecture of a SE scheme is composed of three entities, which are the
cloud server, the data owner, and the authorized users. The cloud server should
perform a search process over an encrypted index without causing any sensitive
information leakage. For that, several security constraints should be respected
when designing a searchable encryption scheme. Several SE approaches that have
been recently proposed in the literature were presented in this chapter.
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Cryptographic Tools
5.1 Motivation
Any searchable encryption scheme needs to encrypt the index while keeping the
ability to exploit it without decryption. For that, traditional encryption schemes
(e,g., AES) are not effective to encrypt the indexes, and thus, other more ap-
propriate cryptosystems should be exploited, such as the SKNN algorithm and
homomorphic encryption.
In this chapter, we start by presenting the SKNN algorithm. After that,
we introduce the ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption which is the most
successful variant of the attribute based encryption. Finally, we present the major
homomorphic encryption schemes that have been proposed in the literature.
5.2 Secure k-NN Algorithm
The secure k nearest neighbor (SkNN) algorithm [44] is used in the searchable
encryption area to encrypt documents and queries that are represented in a vector
space model of size m. SkNN algorithm allows to calculate the similarity (the
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dot product) between an encrypted document vector and an encrypted query
vector without any need of decryption. The SkNN algorithm is composed of
three functions.
• KeyGen. This function consists in generating the encryption key that is
composed of one vector S of size (m+u+1) and two (m+u+1)×(m+u+1)
invertible matrices M1 and M2. Where m is the size of the original vector
space and (u+ 1) is the number of dummy dimensions.
• Enc. The encryption process is done in three steps as follows.
1. Extension. At first, (u+ 1) dimensions are added to each document
vector di of size m. The value 1 is assigned to the (m+1)th dimension,
whereas, a random small value ij is assigned to each (m + j + 1)th
dimension (where j ∈ [1, u]). The u last dimensions correspond to
dummy keywords.
Di = {di, 1, i1, i2, i3, ..., iu} (5.1)
Moreover, a query vector q of size m is multiplied by a random pa-
rameter r. Then, a dimension with a random value t is added to the
obtained vector. After that, u dimensions are added to this vector. a
value αj is assigned to each (m+j+1)th dimension (where αj ∈ {0, 1}).
Q = {r.q, t, α1, α2, α3, ..., αu}/αj ∈ {0, 1} (5.2)
2. Splitting. After that, each document vector Di is split into two
vectors {D′i, D′′i }, and each query vector Q is split into two vectors
{Q′, Q′′}. The vector S is used as a splitting indicator. Indeed, if the
jth element of S is equal to 0, then D′i[j] and D′′i [j] will have the same
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value as Di[j], and each of the two elements Q′[j] and Q′′[j] will have
random values such that their sum is equal to Q[j]. In the case where
the jth element of S is equal to 1, we follow the same principle, except
that the document vector and the query vector are switched.
3. Multiplication. Finally, both M1 and M2 matrices are used to final-
ize the encryption of each document vector and query vector as follows.
 Ii = {M
T
1 ·D′i,MT2 ·D′′i }
Tq = {M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′}
(5.3)
• Eval. When applying the scalar product between a document vector and
a query vector we obtain:
Ii × Tq = {MT1 ·D′i,MT2 ·D′′i } × {M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′}
= D′i ×Q′ +D′′i ×Q′′
= {di, 1, i1 , i2 , i3 , ..., iu} × {r.q, t, α1, α2, α3, ..., αu}
= r · di · q +
U∑
j=1
ij · αj + t
The random parameters {ij , αj, t, r} are used to hide the real similarity
score between a document and a query. However, the alternative similarity
scores are still useful to sort the documents by relevance as was proved by
"Cao et al." [5].
5.3 Attribute Based Encryption
The attribute based encryption (ABE) is an encryption method used to apply an
access control policy in order to control the access to a data collection [90]. It
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consists in adding some attributes to the encrypted data as well as to the users’
private key. During the decryption process, the ciphertext can be decrypted only
if the number of matching attributes between the ciphertext and the private key
exceeds a certain threshold.
Later on, "Goyal et al." proposed an encryption method called "key-policy
attribute based encryption" (KP-ABE) [80] which consists in storing an access
structure in the user’s private key and some attributes in the ciphertext. This
method is able to achieve a fine-grained access control and brings more flexibility
in the management of the users than the previous method. Nevertheless, KP-ABE
has the disadvantage of not being intuitive.
To solve this problem, "Bethencourt et al." proposed an alternative method
called "ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption" (CP-ABE) [78] that works
in the same way as the KP-ABE method except that the access structure is stored
in the ciphertext, whereas, the attributes are stored in the user’s private key.
During the decryption process, if some attributes of the private key satisfy the
access policy of the data, the ciphertext may be decrypted. Otherwise, the user
does not have the right to access this data and his private key cannot decrypt the
ciphertext. For example, if the access policy in the data is "Pediatrics ∧ (Doctor1
∨ Doctor2)" and the user’s secret key contains the attributes "Pediatrics" and
"Doctor1", then the user has the right to access the data and is able to decrypt
the ciphertext using his private key. After that, several approaches based on the
CP-ABE method have been proposed in the literature [91; 92].
CP-ABE consists of five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Delegate. In
the following, we present each of them. We suggest the reader to refer to the
original paper [78] for details.
• Setup → {PK,MK}. The purpose of this algorithm is the generation of
two keys, a public key PK and a master key MK.
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• KeyGen(MK, Au) → SK. This algorithm takes as input the master key
MK and a set of attributes Au. It generates a private key SK for a user
who is associated with the set of attributes Au.
• Enc(PK, M , A) → CT . This algorithm is executed by the data owner in
order to encrypt a message M under an access structure A using a public
key PK.
• Delegate(SK, A′u)→ SK ′. This algorithm takes as input a set of attributes
A′u and a private key SK. The private key is associated with a set of
attributes Au, such that A′u is included in Au. The aim of this algorithm
is to produce a new private key SK ′ which is associated with the set of
attributes A′u.
• Dec(SK, CT , PK)→M . This algorithm is executed by the user to decrypt
a ciphertext CT . It takes as input the ciphertext CT containing an access
structure A, the user’s private key SK containing a set of attributes Au, and
the public key PK. If the set of attributes Au satisfies the access structure
A, the ciphertext CT can be decrypted back to get the original messageM .
5.4 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a cryptosystem that allows mathematical oper-
ations to be performed on encrypted data, generating an encrypted result which,
after decryption, matches the result of the same operations performed on unen-
crypted data (see Formula 5.4).
f (Enc(x1), Enc(x2), ..., Enc(xn)) = Enc (f(x1, x2, ..., xn)) (5.4)
Several homomorphic encryption methods have been proposed in the literature
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[43; 58; 93; 94]. In the following we present some of the major HE schemes that
have been studied in the literature.
5.4.1 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric encryption algorithm pro-
posed by "Paillier" [60] based on the work of "Okamoto and Uchiyama" [95]. It is
an addictive homomorphic encryption method which can calculate the addition
of two ciphertexts without any need of decryption. The Paillier cryptosystem
can be exploited in many fields that need to protect the data privacy such as the
searchable encryption area. In the following we present the three functions of the
Paillier cryptosystem and its two properties.
• KeyGen. This function generates the public and secret keys as follows.
1. Take as input two large primes p and q.
2. Compute n = p× q and λ = LCM(p− 1, q− 1), where "LCM" means
the least common multiple.
3. Select a random integer g ∈ Z∗n2 such that g has order multiple of n.
4. Calculate µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n, where L(x) = x−1
n
.
5. Output pk and sk such that pk = (n, g) and sk = (λ, µ).
• Enc. This function encrypts a message m as follows.
1. Take as input a message m ∈ Zn and the public key pk.
2. Select a random integer r ∈ Z∗n. This ensures the encryption algorithm
to be probabilistic since a plaintext can have several corresponding
ciphertexts.
3. Output a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 , where c = gm × rn mod n2.
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• Dec. This function decrypts a ciphertext c as follows.
1. Take as input a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 and the secret key sk.
2. Output a plaintext message m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
• Add. Given the public key pk and ciphertexts ci, which are valid en-
cryptions of plaintexts mi, where ci = Enc(mi) = gmi · rni mod n2. The
encryption of the addition of two plaintexts m1 and m2 is equal to the
multiplication of the corresponding ciphertexts c1 and c2.
Proof.
c1 × c2 mod n2 =
(
(gm1 · rn1 mod n2)× (gm2 · rn2 mod n2)
)
mod n2
= gm1 · rn1 × gm2 · rn2 mod n2
= gm1+m2 · (r1r2)n mod n2
= Enc(m1 +m2)
• Mult. Given the public key pk, a plaintext m1, and a ciphertext c2 which is
a valid encryption of a plaintextm2, where c2 = Enc(m2) = gm2 ·rn2 mod n2.
The encryption of the multiplication of two plaintexts m1 and m2 is equal
to the ciphertext c2 to the power of the plaintext m1.
Proof.
cm12 mod n
2 = (gm2 · rn2 mod n2)m1 mod n2
= gm1m2 · (rm12 )n mod n2
= Enc(m1 ×m2)
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5.4.2 Ideal Lattice Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption
"Gentry and Boneh" proposed the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
scheme which is based on ideal lattices [43]. The encryption process consists in
hiding the message by adding noise, whereas, the decryption consists in using the
secret key to remove the noise from the message.
This scheme can perform homomorphic operations on arbitrary depth circuit.
For that, the authors start by constructing a somewhat homomorphic encryption
(SWHE) scheme that can perform a limited number of operations. However,
the size of the noise grows after each arithmetic operation, especially when it
consists of multiplication, until it becomes not possible to decrypt. To avoid this
problem, the authors proposed a technique called "bootstrapping" that consists
in refreshing the ciphertext by reducing the size of the noise. This technique
allows to transform a SWHE scheme into a FHE scheme. Nevertheless, this
scheme is still a theoretical model because of its inefficiency. Later on, many
more efficient schemes based on Gentry’s construction have been proposed in the
literature [58; 93; 96; 97; 98; 99; 100].
5.4.3 Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Integers
"Van Dijk et al." proposed a homomorphic encryption scheme [58] that is similar
to the scheme proposed by "Gentry and Boneh" [43] except that it is simpler and
less efficient since it works with integers instead of ideals. The semantic security
of this scheme is based on the hardness assumption of the approximate great
common divisor (GCD) problem [101].
Definition 1. The approximate GCD problem can be defined as follows.
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Given a set of approximate multiples of p {x1, x2, x3, ..., xτ}, where
xi = qi · p+ ri for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ , find p.
In the following, we present the somewhat homomorphic encryption construc-
tion, we suggest the reader to refer to the original paper for details [58].
• KeyGen. The public and secret keys are generated as follows.
1. Take the security parameter λ as input and calculate the parameters
τ , γ and µ based on λ.
2. Generate a random odd µ-bits integer p.
3. For 0 ≤ i ≤ τ , generate random xi = qi · p + ri, where qi ∈ [0, 2γ/p[
and ri ∈]− 2p, 2p[
4. Output sk = p and pk = {x0, x1, x2, ..., xτ}.
• Enc. A message m ∈ {0, 1} is encrypted as follows.
1. Select a random subset S ⊂ {x1, x2, x3, ..., xτ}.
2. Select a random r ∈]− 2p, 2p[.
3. Output c = (m+ 2 · r + 2 ·∑i∈S xi) mod x0.
• Dec. A ciphertext c is decrypted as follows. m = (c mod p) mod 2.
• Eval. Given two ciphertexts c1 and c2 associated with the messages m1 and
m2, respectively. The addition (resp., multiplication) of the two ciphertexts
c1 and c2 is equal to the encryption of the addition (resp., multiplication)
of their associated plaintexts m1 and m2.
 c1 + c2 = Enc(m1 +m2)c1 × c2 = Enc(m1 ×m2)
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In order to obtain a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, the authors applied
the bootstrapping technique proposed by "Gentry and Boneh" [43]. Furthermore,
to resist to the approximate GCD attack, the secret key should be very large,
namely, its size should be at least O˜(λ10) (λ is the security parameter), which is
the major drawback of this cryptosystem.
5.4.4 Homomorphic Encryption from Learning with Errors
"Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan" proposed an asymmetric fully homomorphic en-
cryption scheme that operates over bits [98]. This scheme is based on the ring
learning with errors (RLWE) assumption that was introduced by "Lyubashevsky
et al." [102]. It manipulates polynomials with integer coefficients. In the follow-
ing, we present the different functions of this scheme.
• KeyGen. The public and secret keys are generated as follows.
1. Sample a ring element s from R where, R = Z[X]
F [X]
is the ring of all
polynomials modulo F [X] which is an irreducible degree n polynomial
and Z[X] is the ring of polynomials over the integers.
2. Calculates pk = (a0 = −(a1 · s + 2 · e0), a1), where a1 ∈ Rq is a ring
element with coefficients modulo q and e0 is a ring element with small
coefficients sampled from the discrete Gaussian distribution.
• Enc. This function encrypts a message m as follows.
1. Take as input the message m ∈ {0, 1} and the public key pk = (a0, a1).
2. Sample u, g, h from R.
3. Output c, where, c = (c0, c1) = (a0 · u+ 2 · g +m, a1 · u+ 2 · h).
• Dec. This function decrypts a ciphertext c as follows.
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1. Take as input the ciphertext c = (c0, c1) and the secret key.
2. Compute m˜ = c0 + c1 · s.
3. Output m˜ mod 2.
• Eval. This scheme supports homomorphic addition and multiplication op-
erations. A noise management (re-linearization technique and dimension
modulus reduction technique) should be applied after each multiplication.
The tensor product (resp., addition) of the two ciphertexts is equal to the
encryption of the multiplication (resp., addition) of their associated plain-
texts.
5.4.5 Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The term "leveled" is used to describe this approach because of the secret key
updating performed at each level of a circuit. The latter represents an arithmetic
function and is composed of a set of gates. Each gate corresponds to the operation
of addition or multiplication (see Figure 5.1). Two main techniques are introduced
in the leveled homomorphic encryption1 [94], namely, the key switching and the
modulus switching.
• Key switching. It is a technique inspired by another technique called
"re-linearization" proposed by "Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan" [88; 98].
The key switching consists in the transition to a new key at each level of
the circuit. Its main purpose is to reduce the size of ciphertexts in order
to preserve the system efficiency during the calculations. This technique
consists of two main functions.
1In the rest of the thesis, the expression "leveled homomorphic encryption" will be used to
describe this encryption method for simplicity.
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Figure 5.1: Example of an arithmetic circuit
– SwitchKeyGen(s1, s2, q)→ B. This function takes as input two private
keys s1 and s2, and a modulus q. Its aim is to construct a public key
(a matrix B) which enables the transition from the private key s1 to
a new private key s2.
– SwitchKey(B, c1)→ c2. This function takes as input the matrix B con-
structed by the function SwitchKeyGen, and a ciphertext c1 encrypted
by the private key s1. Its task is to produce a smaller ciphertext c2 that
encrypts the same message as the ciphertext c1, and is decryptable by
the second private key s2.
• Modulus switching. It is a refinement of the dimension reduction tech-
nique proposed by "Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan" [88]. This method con-
sists in reducing the modulus from q to p (p < q) in order to better manage
the error contained in the ciphertext. In fact, the size of the error affects the
number of homomorphic operations that is possible, since this size decreases
after each multiplication. Thus, the aim of this technique is to switch from
an exponential reduction of the error size after a multiplication to a linear
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reduction, which increases the number of homomorphic operations.
5.5 Summary
Three categories of encryption schemes frequently exploited in the searchable
encryption area have been presented in this chapter.
First, we introduced the SKNN algorithm which is an order preserving sym-
metric encryption that allows to encrypt vectors while keeping the ability to
calculate the similarity between those encrypted vectors by applying the inner
product operation. This cryptosystem is the most used in the SE area.
After that, we briefly explained the attribute based encryption that can be
exploited to encrypt datasets when an access control policy should be applied.
Finally, we presented several variants of homomorphic encryption which is an
encryption method that allows a third party to apply functions on encrypted data,
and to obtain encrypted results without any need of decryption. However, many
efficiency issues may be encountered such as the large size of ciphertexts and the
slowness of the arithmetic operations. These drawbacks make this encryption
scheme very difficult to be exploited in practice.
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Chapter 6
Concept Based Semantic Searchable
Encryption
6.1 Motivation
The majority of searchable encryption schemes that have been proposed in the
literature perform a keyword based search, but few studies [64; 65; 67; 68; 103]
have exploited a semantic search over encrypted cloud data (see Subsection 4.4.4).
These works are based on the query expansion technique that consists in adding
the synonyms of the query terms. The drawback of these schemes is that, except
the synonymy, other relationships between terms, such as the associative rela-
tionship, the homonymy, the instance-of relationship, and the related terms are
not exploited. In other words, these techniques allow to improve the recall, but
they are still far from the real semantic search.
Among the fields of semantic information retrieval, there are the contextual
IR, the personalized IR, and the conceptual information retrieval1. Contrary to
the other areas of the semantic search, machine learning, search context, and
1In this thesis, "conceptual IR" and "concept based IR" refer to the same area.
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user profile are not utilized in the concept based IR. Therefore, the server can
learn nothing, neither about the user interests nor about the content of the data
collection. Consequently, the conceptual IR is the most appropriate for the con-
struction of a semantic searchable encryption scheme.
Conceptual IR is based on concepts rather than keywords in the indexing
and matching processes. Therefore, it is necessary to use an external knowledge
base, such as an ontology or a thesaurus to perform the mapping process between
keywords and concepts. Conceptual IR allows to detach from the syntactic aspect
and take advantage of the natural language to perform a semantic guided search
rather than relying on the syntax of the query.
In the rest of this chapter, we present the problem formulation and our pro-
posed scheme.
6.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, the threat model, the design goals, and the system model are
presented.
6.2.1 Threat Model
The security is a crucial aspect in cloud computing given that the outsourced
data are often personal or professional. The cloud server is exposed to all kinds
of external attacks. Therefore, every data (document, Index, query) should be
encrypted before being outsourced. Moreover, we suppose that the cloud server is
honest-but-curious, and can collect information about the content of documents
by doing statistical analyzes. Hence, the search process should be secure and has
to protect the data privacy.
When designing an SE scheme, it is important to take into account the threats
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discussed below. For this reason, several security constraints were elaborated
in the literature (see Section 4.3.2). In this work, we focus on two security
constraints, namely, the keyword privacy and the query unlinkability, in order
to make our scheme IND-CSK2 secure.
6.2.2 Design Goals
Our goal is to propose a semantic searchable scheme over encrypted cloud data.
For that, the Wikipedia ontology is exploited during the indexing and search pro-
cesses. The documents and queries are represented in a vector space of dimension
n (where n is the total number of concepts). Therefore, it is necessary to use an
encryption method applicable on vectors such as the SkNN algorithm (see Sec-
tion 5.2). Moreover, in order to effectively exploit the Wikipedia ontology over
encrypted data, a new weighting formula is proposed. Two major contributions
are proposed in this work.
1. Introducing the Wikipedia ontology to the searchable encryption.
2. Proposition of a new weighting formula in order to effectively exploit the
Wikipedia ontology in searchable encryption
6.2.3 System Model
Our proposed scheme exploits the Wikipedia ontology during the indexing pro-
cess of documents and queries. Indeed, after the creation of the keyword based
index, each document is represented by a vector of terms, and from those vectors,
the data owner can construct a vector of concepts for each document using the
Wikipedia ontology which is stored in an internal and trusted server. The set
of the conceptual vectors corresponds to the index of the data collection. Then,
the data collection is encrypted using AES, whereas, the concept based index
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Figure 6.1: System Model
is encrypted using the SkNN algorithm. After the encryption process is done,
both the encrypted data collection and the secure index are outsourced to the
cloud server. When an authorized user builds and sends an encrypted query to
the server. The latter calculates the scalar product between each document vec-
tor and the query vector, and returns the most relevant documents to the user
(Figure 6.1).
6.3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present in detail our proposed approach that we call "semantic
searchable encryption" (SSE) scheme.
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Figure 6.2: Wikipedia ontology
6.3.1 Wikipedia as Ontology
In order to exploit the meaning of queries and documents, many researchers have
utilized external resources such as dictionaries, thesauri, semantic graphs, and
ontologies. In our work, we opted for the use of an ontology due to its robustness
and reliability. More precisely, we decided to use Wikipedia as an ontology. The
choice of Wikipedia is guided by its great richness of information given that it
contains more than 4 million English pages, in addition, it contains articles in all
areas and most languages.
The Wikipedia ontology is constructed as follows [31; 104] (see Figure 6.2 and
Subsection 2.6.2.1).
1. First, we suppose that each Wikipedia page corresponds to a concept (e.g.,
"Economy of China").
2. After that, each concept is represented by a set of weighted terms extracted
from the corresponding page (e.g., Economy of China = {(market, 45),
(money, 35), (economy, 30), (China, 12), ...}, where "market", "money",
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"economy", and "China" are terms and "Economy of China" is a concept).
3. Finally, in order to accelerate the mapping process, an inverted index is
created where each term is represented by a set of weighted concepts (e.g.,
China = {(Economy of China, 12), (Chinese literature, 10), ...}, where
"Economy of China" and "Chinese literature" are concepts, and "China"
is a term).
To implement our proposed scheme, we have constructed an ontology based
on a version of Wikipedia dated 12th March, 2015 containing 4 828 395 English
pages. We have exploited 4 342 689 pages given that the special pages and those
containing less than 100 words were ignored. The Wikipedia ontology that we
have constructed contains 3 965 848 entries (terms), and each entry points on a
set of at most 5 000 concepts.
6.3.2 Double Score Weighting Formula
Concept based IR allows users to find relevant documents even if they do not
contain query terms or their synonyms. This is explained by the fact that the
search process is guided by the meaning through the use of an ontology.
Let us take the example given by "Egozi et al." [104]. Suppose that a user
sends the query "shipwreck salvaging treasure" and the data collection contains
the document entitled "Ancient artifacts found" (see Table 6.1). A keyword
based search approach cannot retrieve that document since it has no term in
common with the query. However, with the conceptual IR, this document would
be returned to the user given that the document vector has few concepts in
common with the query vector.
Unfortunately, it happens that a conceptual search approach returns irrele-
vant documents that contain some query terms. To illustrate this, an example
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Table 6.1: Two sample documents
Document title Content
Ancient artifacts found Divers have recovered artifacts lying underwater
for more than 2,000 years in the wreck of a Roman
ship that sank in the Gulf of Baratti, 12 miles off
the island of Elba, newspapers reported Saturday.
Olympic news in brief Cycling win for Estonia. Erika Salumae won
Estonia’s first Olympic gold when retaining the
women’s cycling individual sprint title she won
four years ago in Seoul as a Soviet athlete.
was given by "Egozi et al." [104], if a user sends the query "Estonia economy"
and the data collection contains the document entitled "Olympic news in brief"
(see Table 6.1). As the keyword based search, conceptual search approaches can-
not ignore this irrelevant document. This is justified by the high frequency of
the term "Estonia" in the document "Olympic news in brief", and thus, the vec-
tor representing that document contains many concepts associated with the term
"Estonia". Similarly, more than half of the concepts of the vector representing
the query "Estonia economy" are associated with the term "Estonia". Therefore,
there are many common concepts (34 concepts were found in our experimental
study) between the document vector and the query vector. Consequently, a con-
cept based search approach may return the document "Olympic news in brief" in
response to the query "Estonia economy", despite it is supposed to be irrelevant.
In order to understand the root cause, we analyzed the top 10 concepts rep-
resenting the document "Olympic news in brief" and the top 10 concepts repre-
senting the query "Estonia economy" (Table 6.2). We also analyzed the top 10
concepts associated with the terms "economy" and "Estonia", separately (Table
6.3).
On one hand, we notice that 8 of the top 10 concepts representing the docu-
ment "Olympic news in brief" are part of the top 10 concepts associated with the
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Table 6.2: Top 10 concepts when applying TFIDF formula
Rank Document (Olympic News In Brief) Query (Estonia economy)
1 Estonia national football team 2003 (0.81) Estonia national football team 2003 (0.40)
2 Estonia national football team 1997 (0.78) Estonia national football team 1997 (0.39)
3 Estonia national football team 1998 (0.72) Estonia national football team 1998 (0.36)
4 Estonia national football team 1995 (0.68) Estonia national football team 1995 (0.34)
5 Estonia national football team 1993 (0.63) Estonia national football team 1993 (0.32)
6 Estonia national football team 1994 (0.59) Estonia national football team 1994 (0.30)
7 UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying Group 4 (0.48) UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying Group 4 (0.25)
8 Energy in Estonia (0.46) Energy in Estonia (0.23)
9 Estonia at the Olympics (0.41) UEFA Euro 2004 qualifying Group 8 (0.19)
10 Estonia at the 2012 Winter Youth Olympics (0.41) 1994 FIFA World Cup qualification (Group 1) (0.19)
Table 6.3: Top 10 concepts of terms, "Estonia" and "economy"
Rank Term (Estonia) Term (Economy)
1 Estonia national football team 2003 (0.40) Closed household economy (0.16)
2 Estonia national football team 1997 (0.39) Information economy (0.14)
3 Estonia national football team 1998 (0.36) Small open economy (0.13)
4 Estonia national football team 1995 (0.34) Tiger economy (0.12)
5 Estonia national football team 1993 (0.32) Ministry of Economy (Bulgaria) (0.09)
6 Estonia national football team 1994 (0.30) Review of African Political Economy (0.09)
7 UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying Group 4 (0.25) Natural economy (0.09)
8 Energy in Estonia (0.23) Lithium economy (0.09)
9 UEFA Euro 2004 qualifying Group 8 (0.19) Pancasila economics (0.09)
10 1994 FIFA World Cup qualification (Group 1) (0.19) Socialist-oriented market economy (0.08)
term "Estonia". This is justified by the high frequency of the term "Estonia" in
the document "Olympic news in brief" which increases the scores of the concepts
associated with this term when applying Formula 2.5. On the other hand, even if
the frequencies of the query terms are similar, we notice that the majority of the
concepts representing the query are associated with the term "Estonia" instead
of the term "economy". This is due to the fact that the concepts associated with
the term "Estonia" have greater weights, and thus most of these concepts are
selected to represent the query.
In order to represent documents and queries by the most appropriate con-
cepts, we propose a new weighting formula that we call "double score weighting"
(DSW) Formula which allows to represent a document (or a query) by a set of
concepts strongly associated with the general meaning of the document rather
than representing it by concepts associated with terms that have the highest
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frequencies.
In Wikipedia ontology, each term is associated with a set of concepts. Thus, to
represent a document by the most appropriate concepts, our idea is to select the
concepts that are associated with the greatest number of terms of the document.
For example, if we have the query "Estonia economy", to represent this query,
it is more advantageous to choose a concept associated with both "Estonia" and
"economy" than choosing a concept only associated with the term "Estonia",
even if the second concept has a greater score.
The proposed DSW formula allows to represent a document by concepts that
are associated with its general meaning. In the following, we present the steps
needed to represent a document by the most appropriate concepts using DSW
formula.
1. Construct a weighted term vector for the document by applying the TFIDF
formula.
2. Get all concepts associated with each term of the document vector con-
structed above by using the Wikipedia ontology.
3. Attribute two scores for each of these concepts as follows.
(a) The first score corresponds to the number of distinct terms of the
document vector associated with the concept. This score is called the
primary score (Sp).
(b) The second score is the TFIDF weight of the concept in the docu-
ment. This score is called the secondary score (Ss) and is calculated
by Formula 2.5.
4. Sort the concepts with regard to their primary scores, then based on their
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secondary scores in the case of equality.
(Sp1, Ss1) > (Sp2, Ss2)⇒ (Sp1 > Sp2) ∨ ((Sp1 = Sp2) ∧ (Ss1 > Ss2)) (6.1)
5. Keep the topX concepts with their associated primary and secondary scores
to represent the document.
We applied our method on the first example to calculate the similarity between
the document "Ancient artifacts found" and the query "shipwreck salvaging trea-
sure". We found that there are 13 common concepts between the top 100 con-
cepts representing the document and the top 100 concepts representing the query
(see Table 6.4) rather than one concept when applying the method proposed by
"Gabrilovich and Markovitch" [31]. Thus, as Gabrilovich’s method, our method
is able to retrieve relevant documents even if they have no term in common with
the query. Besides, our method is more efficient than the Gabrilovich’s method
in retrieving relevant documents (13 common concepts in our method versus 1
common concept in Gabrilovich’s method).
Similarly, we applied our method on the second example to calculate the sim-
ilarity between the document "Olympic news in brief" and the query "Estonia
economy". We did not find any common concepts between the top 100 con-
cepts representing the document and the top 100 concepts representing the query
(see Table 6.5) which is correct since this document is not relevant to the query
"Estonia economy". On the other hand, 34 common concepts were found when
Gabrilovich’s method was applied. Therefore, the DSW formula allows to cor-
rect the problem encountered when applying Gabrilovich’s method, and thus, our
proposed formula is able to ignore irrelevant documents even if they have terms
in common with the query.
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Table 6.4: Top 10 concepts when applying DSW formula (example 1)
Rank Document (Ancient Artifacts Found) Query (salvaging shipwreck treasure)
1 San Esteban (1554 shipwreck) (7, 0.006) Abandoned Shipwrecks Act (3, 0.11)
2 Roosevelt Inlet Shipwreck (6, 0.17) Treasure hunting (marine) (3, 0.10)
3 SS Vienna (1873) (6, 0.12) 1715 Treasure Fleet (3, 0.09)
4 SS Sagamore (1892) (6, 0.11) Brent Brisben (3, 0.07)
5 SS Samuel Mather (1887) (6, 0.10) Odyssey Marine Exploration (3, 0.06)
6 El Nuevo Constante (6, 0.09) Nuestra Senora de Atocha (3, 0.05)
7 Antikythera wreck (6, 0.09) Urca de Lima (3, 0.05)
8 Comet (steamboat) (6, 0.08) Barry Clifford (3, 0.04)
9 Underwater archaeology (6, 0.08) Comet (steamboat) (3, 0.04)
10 Mel Fisher (6, 0.07) E. Lee Spence (3, 0.04)
19 San Esteban (1554 shipwreck) (3, 0.02)
63 Mel Fisher (2, 0.03)
73 El Nuevo Constante (2, 0.02)
Table 6.5: Top 10 concepts when applying DSW formula (example 2)
Rank Document (Olympic News In Brief) Query (Estonia economy)
1 Jorg Schmidt (7, 0.25) Baltic Tiger (2, 0.07)
2 Chu Mu-yen (7, 0.23) Estonian European Union membership referendum (2, 0.06)
3 Pavel Lednyov (7, 0.22) Economy of Estonia (2, 0.06)
4 Erika Meszaros (7, 0.20) Tiit Vahi (2, 0.04)
5 Estonia at the Olympics (6, 0.41) Estonian Hound (2, 0.03)
6 Chile at the Olympics (6, 0.32) Baltic states housing bubble (2, 0.03)
7 Erwin Keller (6, 0.31) Post-communism (2, 0.03)
8 Portugal at the Olympics (6, 0.28) Currency board (2, 0.02)
9 Georgeta Damian (6, 0.28) OECD Development Centre (2, 0.02)
10 Yuriy Poyarkov (6, 0.27) Rosario Manalo (2, 0.01)
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6.3.3 Semantic Searchable Encryption Scheme
Our proposed appraoch called "semantic searchable encryption" (SSE) scheme
is composed of five functions (KeyGen, BuildOnto, BuildIndex, Trapdoor, and
Search), and two main phases (Initialization and Retrieval phases). In the fol-
lowing, we present the five functions of our scheme.
• KeyGen (m, u) ⇒ SK. The data owner randomly generates a secret key
SK = {S,M1,M2}, where S is a vector of size (m + u + 1) and (M1,M2)
are two invertible matrices of size (m+ u+ 1)× (m+ u+ 1).
• BuildOnto ⇒ Iwiki. The ontology is built from Wikipedia as follows. First,
we suppose that each Wikipedia page corresponds to a concept. Then, the
English Wikipedia pages are indexed, where each page is represented by a
vector of weighted terms by applying the TFIDF formula. Finally, to ac-
celerate the mapping process between a term an its associated concepts, an
inverted index of Wikipedia Iwiki is created where each term is represented
by a vector of weighted concepts (see Subsection 6.3.1 for details).
• BuildIndex (F , SK) ⇒ I ′. The secure concept based index is built as fol-
lows. First, a vector of terms is constructed for each document of the data
collection F by applying the TFIDF formula. Then, using the Wikipedia
ontology and the term vectors, a vector of concepts is built for each doc-
ument by applying the DSW formula (see Subsection 6.3.2). Finally, each
vector of concepts is encrypted by applying the SkNN algorithm using the
secret key SK (see Section 5.2). The set of the encrypted vectors constitutes
the secure index I ′ of the data collection F .
• Trapdoor (W , SK) ⇒ T . A trapdoor T (encrypted query) is built from
the query terms as follows. First, a vector of terms is constructed from
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the query keywords W , where the ith field of the vector is set to 1 if the
query contains the corresponding term, otherwise, it is set to 0. After
that, a vector of concepts is constructed to represent the query, by applying
the DSW formula that exploits the Wikipedia ontology and the vector of
terms (see Subsection 6.3.2). Finally, the vector of concepts is encrypted
by applying the SkNN algorithm that uses the secret key SK (see Section
5.2).
• Search (T , I ′, k). Upon receipt of the trapdoor T (represented by an
encrypted vector of concepts), the cloud server calculates the scalar product
between each document vector and the query vector. After that, Formula
6.1 is applied to sort the documents on the basis of their primary scores,
and possibly their secondary scores in case of equality. Finally, the top-k
document IDs are returned to the user.
The search process consists of two main steps.
• Initialization phase. In this phase, the data owner prepares the search
environment as follows.
1. At first, the KeyGen function is called to generate a secret key SK that
is shared with the authorized users through a secure communication
protocol.
2. Then, the BuildOnto function is called to construct an ontology from
Wikipedia. This ontology is stored in an internal and trusted server,
and is accessible by the authorized users.
3. Finally, the BuildIndex function is called to construct a secure index
from a collection of documents. The secure index and the encrypted
data collection1 are outsourced to the cloud server.
1The data collection is encrypted with a robust encryption algorithm such as AES.
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• Retrieval phase. This is the phase where the search process is performed as
follows.
1. First, an authorized user calls the Trapdoor function to build an en-
crypted query that is sent to the cloud server.
2. Upon the server receives the trapdoor, it calls the Search function, and
returns to the user the top-k document IDs.
6.4 Result and Comparison
"Yahoo! Answers"1 is a website that allows users to ask, or answer questions
that are asked by other users. A data collection is collected from this website
to create the "Yahoo! Answers" corpus. This collection is composed of 142 627
questions and 962 232 answers. We performed our experimental study over this
corpus. For that, we suppose that the queries correspond to the questions and
the documents correspond to the answers.
We tested 1 150 randomly selected queries to compare our proposed scheme
with two other schemes. The first one is a keyword based scheme called MRSE
[5], whereas, the second one is a concept based scheme proposed by "Gabrilovich
and Markovitch" [31].
Each scheme returns 100 documents in response to a received query. we cal-
culated the total number of relevant documents that have been retrieved in each
scheme according to the number of queries. Figure 6.3 shows that the returned
results in our proposed scheme have better accuracy than the returned results
in the MRSE scheme (60% of improvement) due to the use of a concept based
search in our approach. Moreover, our approach returns better results than the
Gabrilovich’s scheme (36% of improvement) due to the use of the proposed DSW
1https://answers.yahoo.com/, Feb. 2019.
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Figure 6.3: The number of relevant documents that have been retrieved according
to the number of queries in three different approaches.
formula in our approach. This clearly demonstrates that applying a concept based
search (Our approach and Gabrilovich’s scheme) increases the recall compared to
a keyword based search approach (i.e, MRSE scheme). Moreover, our experi-
ments confirm that the proposed DSW formula is more efficient than TFIDF
formula used in the Gabrilovich’s scheme.
Then, in order to test the quality of the results that are returned by each
scheme, we suppose that the detailed answers are better than the short ones.
Thus, to measure the quality of the retrieved documents, we added a filter that
ignores the documents which have a size less than a given threshold α. We have
gradually increased the value of this threshold as follows, α = 0 in the first 50
queries, then, α = 10 in the 50 queries that follow, then, α = 20 in the third
group of the 50 queries, and so on. Figure 6.4 shows that the returned results
in our proposed scheme have better accuracy than the returned results in both
MRSE scheme and Gabrilovich’s scheme. Indeed, our proposed scheme improves
the accuracy by 67% compared to the Gabrilovich’s scheme and 84% compared
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Figure 6.4: The number of relevant documents that have been retrieved according
to the number of queries in three different approaches when applying a filter.
to the MRSE scheme.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we identified the problems of keyword based information retrieval
that is exploited in most searchable encryption approaches. To fix these problems,
we proposed a new semantic searchable encryption scheme. In fact, the use of a
concept based search allows a significant enhancement of the recall by retrieving
relevant documents even if they do not contain any query term. Moreover, the use
of the proposed DSW formula rather than TFIDF formula allows to increase the
precision by ignoring irrelevant documents that contain terms in common with
the query. Finally, We validated our scheme by an experimental study, where we
have compared our scheme with two other schemes proposed in the literature.
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Chapter 7
Accelerated Searchable Encryption
7.1 Motivation
For privacy and feasibility concerns, the vector representation of documents and
queries is the most exploited in the SE area, instead of the inverted index [5;
6; 7; 41; 56]. Unfortunately, this kind of representation has a negative effect on
the search performance in terms of processing time, given that, during the search
process, the query vector should be compared with each document vector. For
instance, if there are one million documents, the similarity function which is a
time consuming operation would be called one million times.
Very few studies [4; 6] focused on the search performance by compressing
the index in order to accelerate the search process. However, this technique
causes the degradation of the quality of results without significantly improving
the performance.
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, all prior works assume that only
one query is received at the same time. However, In practice, the server may
receive several queries sent from different users simultaneously, making the search
performance issue more complicated, since the search process is already slow while
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treating a single query. To overcome this challenge, we propose several techniques
that enable the server to treat multiple queries simultaneously and respond to
each user within a reasonable time.
The goal of this work is to propose some techniques which allow to accelerate
any searchable encryption scheme that uses the vector space model without any
degradation on the search quality in terms of recall and precision. Our proposed
parallelization techniques exploit several high performance computing (HPC) ar-
chitectures, such as a multi-core CPU processor, a computer cluster, and a graphic
processing unit (GPU) in order to accelerate the search process by distributing
the work between several processes and treating lots of queries simultaneously.
These solutions allow to achieve a speed-up of 46x.
The first challenge of our work is to find the most appropriate way to par-
allelize the search process and take benefit of each HPC architecture, whereas,
the second one consists in reducing the number of servers without degrading the
search performance by treating several queries simultaneously.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we describe the back-
ground information of our work. After that, we give an overview of the problem
that we have faced. Then, we present the techniques that we have proposed to
accelerate the search over encrypted cloud data. Finally, we present the results
of our experimental study.
7.2 Background
In this section, we briefly describe the background information of our work, where
a summary of few HPC architectures that we have used in this work are disclosed.
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7.2.1 Graphic Processing Unit (GPU)
GPU is a graphic processor that has a highly parallel structure which makes it
very efficient for graphic tasks such as video memory management, signal pro-
cessing, and image compression. Recently, other areas such as the industry and
research are interested in using the GPU in parallel with the CPU in order to
accelerate the calculations.
GPU architecture is based on SIMT paradigm (Single Instruction, Multiple
Threads). When a program called "kernel" is launched on the GPU, it is executed
in a parallel way by the different threads. GPUs are structured so that each set
of threads is grouped in a block and each set of blocks is grouped in a grid. The
number of threads and blocks is specified when the kernel is launched. Threads
of the same block can access to a cached memory called "shared memory". All
threads have access to other slower and larger memories such as the "global
memory" and the "constant memory" (see Figure 7.1).
Unlike CPU that includes a limited number of cores optimized for sequential
processing, a GPU includes thousands of cores designed to deal effectively with a
huge number of tasks, simultaneously. Therefore, to take advantage of the use of
GPU and get the best performance, it is recommended1 to assign to the GPU the
heaviest portions of source code that can be calculated in a parallel way such as
large matrices. The remainder of the source code that runs in a sequential way
must be assigned to the CPU.
7.2.2 Computer cluster
A computer cluster is a grouping of a set of computers called "nodes" that appears
as a single computer much more powerful in terms of processing power, storage
space, and system memory. A computer cluster is constructed of a set of nodes.
1http://docs.nvidia.com/cuda/cuda-c-programming-guide/, Feb. 2019.
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Figure 7.1: Memory hierarchy in a GPU [105]
Each node can launch several processes simultaneously. Each node has a local
memory that is shared between its different processes and is not accessible from
other nodes. One process called "master" is chosen to be responsible for the
distribution of the processing between the different nodes. A computer cluster
architecture allows to perform calculations in a parallel way.
7.3 Problem formulation
Our work aims to improve the search performance. It is based on two main
assumptions.
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7.3.1 Huge Number of Documents
In searchable encryption area, it is very difficult to represent a data collection by
an inverted index while respecting the security constraints and without causing
any sensitive information leakage. It is mainly for this reason that the major
approaches that have been proposed in the literature preferred to use a vector
representation of documents to create a secure index [5; 7; 59; 67; 106; 107; 108].
In addition, it is easier to encrypt vectors while keeping the ability to make
calculations over them during the search process. In this representation, each
document and query is represented by a vector of size n, where n is the total
number of terms in the data collection or the total number of concepts in the
ontology, depending on the approach.
Cloud computing is often used when a user has a huge number of documents
to be hosted or a large amount of data to be processed. During the search process,
the server has to calculate the scalar product between each document vector and
the query vector, sorts the result, and returns the top-k documents that have the
highest scores to the user. Considering the huge number of documents on the one
hand, and the non-use of an inverted index on the other hand, the search process
may be slower than expected (in our experiments, it took about 32s to perform
a search on a collection of 400 000 documents). This drawback can cause users
dissatisfaction or worse, the abandonment of cloud computing.
Therefore, our first contribution aims to improve the search performance and
make the search process much faster. For this purpose, we propose four techniques
that utilize few HPC architectures in order to achieve a parallel computing. The
idea is to exploit the parallelism during the calculation of the similarity scores,
and during the sort of documents. The proposed techniques are applicable in any
approach that exploits the vector representation of documents and queries.
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7.3.2 Huge Number of Queries
Another problem that may be encountered in the information retrieval is when
many queries are received simultaneously. This problem is even more pronounced
in the searchable encryption given that no inverted index is used, and hence the
search process is slower. This problem can be solved by providing enough servers
in order to simultaneously process all queries that have been received at the same
time by the cloud. Unfortunately, this solution is costly for the user who would
pay for the use of these servers.
The goal of our second contribution is to manage several queries simultane-
ously, on condition that these queries are destined to the same data collection.
Thus, instead of processing sequentially the queries that have been received at
the same time, the cloud server performs several searches simultaneously, and
returns to each user a list of top-k documents in response to his request. This
new contribution allows the cloud to decrease the number of calculators, without
causing any large deterioration in the search performance.
7.4 Proposed Techniques
In this section, we present the four techniques that we propose to accelerate the
search process over encrypted cloud data. For that, we start with an overview of
the proposed techniques. Then, we present the different functions of the search
process that we want to accelerate using our proposed techniques. Finally, we
explain in detail the proposed solutions.
7.4.1 Overview
These new techniques aim to accelerate any searchable encryption approach based
on the vector model. Indeed, these techniques allow to significantly reduce the
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search time without causing any degradation on the recall and precision. In other
words, our solutions have no effect on the search results, but the search process
becomes much faster.
In fact, the acceleration is done at the cloud server where the search process
is executed. As mentioned above, there are two assumptions that have been
taken into consideration when designing our techniques, namely, a huge number
of documents are hosted in the cloud, and lots of queries may be simultaneously
received. It is important to remember that in the vector space model, each docu-
ment is represented by a vector, and the same goes for the queries, and during the
search process the query vector is compared with each document vector. There-
fore, in order to accelerate the search process, we exploit the parallel computing
by distributing the documents between different processes, and treating multiple
queries simultaneously.
7.4.2 Functions to Accelerate
As explained in the previous subsection, accelerating the search process is done
at the cloud side. Therefore, we propose an accelerated version for each function
supposed to be called by the cloud server. These accelerations are achieved by
taking into account the two assumptions previously presented (huge number of
documents, and lots of queries simultaneously received). We adapt each function
used by the cloud server to our assumptions. Indeed, we designed these functions
so that they can manage several queries simultaneously (contribution 2). The
way these functions are exploited based on the architecture of the calculator
(contribution 1) is explained in the next subsection.
The search process is composed of three main functions (Similarity, Sort, and
Merge).
• Similarity (di, Q)→ R. This function has two parameters, namely, a docu-
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ment vector di, and a set of query vectors Q = {q1, q2, ..., qn}. The similarity
function computes the scalar product between the document vector di and
each query vector qj, with j ∈ [1, n]. The result is a list R of size n, where
the jth field corresponds to the similarity score between the document di
and the query qj.
• Sort (dij, D, k)→ r. This function returns the rank r of a document di with
regard to a set of documents D = {d1j, d2j, ..., dmj}, with dij = (di, sij), and
sij corresponds to the similarity score between the document di and a query
qj. The rank r is calculated by counting the number of documents of the set
D that have a higher score than the document di. During the computing
process, if the rank r exceeds a given value k, the function is stopped and
the value −1 is returned (see Algorithm 1). This is justified by the fact
that only the top-k documents that have the highest scores are important.
Algorithm 1 Sort
Require: dij = (di, sij);D = {d1j, d2j, ..., dmj}; k
Ensure: Rank r of the document di for a query qj
r ← 0
for x = 1 to m do
if sij < sxj then
r ← r + 1
end if
if r > k then
r ← −1
break
end if
end for
• Merge (D′, D′′, k)→ D. This function takes as parameters two sorted lists
of documents D′ and D′′, and an integer k. Its aim is to merge the two
lists D′ and D′′ into a single sorted list of top-k documents (see Algorithm
2). The merge function is often used in the case where two processors work
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simultaneously on different documents and each of them returns its own
result.
Algorithm 2 Merge
Require: k; D′ = {d′1j, d′2j, ..., d′kj}/d′ij = (d′i, s′ij);D′′ = {d′′1j, d′′2j, ..., d′′kj}/d′′ij =
(d′′i , s
′′
ij)
Ensure: D = {d1j, d2j, ..., dkj}/dij = (di, sij)
x← 1, y ← 1, z ← 1
while z ≤ k do
if s′xj > s′′yj then
dzj ← d′xj
x← x+ 1
z ← z + 1
else
dzj ← d′′yj
y ← y + 1
z ← z + 1
end if
end while
7.4.3 The proposed Techniques
In this subsection, we present the different techniques that we have proposed
in order to accelerate the search process. Each technique is an adaptation of
the different functions of the search process (Similarity, Sort, and Merge) for an
HPC architecture (GPU, multi-core CPU processor, and computer cluster). Each
technique operates in a parallel way where many processes work simultaneously.
The difference between these calculators is mainly at their architectures such as
the number of threads that can be executed simultaneously, the shared memory
between threads, and the data transmission time from the CPU (the master
process in the case of the computer cluster) to the different threads (see Table
7.1). In the following, we present our four proposed techniques.
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Table 7.1: Comparison between three HPC architectures
Architecture Availability
of shared
memory
between
threads
Number
of threads
Data trans-
mission time
to the threads
Multi-core
CPU processor
Yes Dozens Fast
GPU Yes (but there
is no shared
memory between
GPU and CPU)
Thousands Slow
Computer cluster Partially (no
shared memory is
available between
the processes of
different nodes)
Hundreds Slow
7.4.3.1 Multi-Core Based Solution
In this technique, several threads are executed simultaneously, where the pro-
cessing of documents is distributed between them. Moreover, each thread has
access to the main memory. The search process in a multi-core CPU processor is
accomplished as follows.
1. First, the main process receives a set of queries destined for the same data
collection.
2. Upon receiving the queries, it launches a set of threads (the number of
threads is greater than or equal to the number of cores).
3. After that, the main process sends to each thread, the received queries and
a subset of documents (the documents are equitably distributed between
the different threads).
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4. The threads work simultaneously. Each of them calls the Similarity function
to calculate the similarity score between each of its documents and each
query, so that a document has several scores, each of them corresponds to
a query.
5. Then, the main process synchronizes the threads. For that, it waits until
all threads finish their work before starting the next step.
6. Next, for each query, each thread calls the Sort function to assign a rank
to each of its documents compared with the whole documents of the data
collection, including those of other threads, since the main memory is shared
between all threads. Therefore, a document has several ranks where each
rank corresponds to a query.
7. Finally, when all threads finish their works, the main process collects for
each query, a list of top-k documents.
7.4.3.2 GPU Based Solution
In this technique, we adapted the search process for a GPU. For that, each GPU
thread has to deal with only one document. It should be noted that the GPU
global memory can be accessed by any thread. The search process in a GPU can
be performed as follows.
1. First, the CPU receives at the same time several queries destined for the
same data collection.
2. Upon the queries are received, it transfers both the document vectors and
the received queries to the GPU.
3. The GPU launches enough threads so that each thread deals with only one
document.
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4. After that, each thread calls the Similarity function to calculate the sim-
ilarity score between a document and each received query, so that each
document has a score for each query.
5. Each thread waits until all other threads finish their work before it proceeds
to the next step.
6. Then, for each query, a thread calls the Sort function to assign a rank to
its document compared with the documents of other threads given that the
global memory is accessible by all threads. That way, each document will
have a rank for each query.
7. Finally, the GPU transfers to the CPU a set of lists of to-k documents where
each list corresponds to the result of a query.
7.4.3.3 Hybrid Solution
In this technique, the idea is not to let the CPU pending while the GPU is
working. For that, we thought of sharing the work between the CPU and the
GPU. Each of them deals with a part of the data collection by calling its own
threads. Thus, this solution is an aggregation of the two previous solutions. In
the following we give the details of this third solution.
1. First, the CPU receives a set of queries destined for the same collection of
documents.
2. Upon the queries are received, it launches a set of threads, and sends to
them the received queries and a part of the index (a subset of document
vectors).
3. Then, it sends the other part of the index as well as the received queries to
the GPU.
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4. After that, the "multi-core based solution" (steps 4 to 7) is applied by the
CPU to obtain for each query a list of top-k documents.
5. Simultaneously, the "GPU based solution" (steps 3 to 7) is applied by the
GPU to obtain for each query a list of top-k documents.
6. Finally, for each query, the CPU calls the Merge function to merge the list
of documents retrieved by the GPU with the list of documents retrieved by
the CPU into a single list of top-k documents.
7.4.3.4 Cluster Based Solution
In this technique, the search process is distributed between the different nodes of
the computer cluster. It is important to know that the nodes do not share any
memory between them. Thus, each node which is composed of a set of processes,
works completely autonomously of other nodes. The search process in a computer
cluster is performed as follows.
1. First, the master process receives several queries destined for the same data
collection.
2. Upon receiving the queries, the master process distributed the treatment
between different processes. For that, it sends to each process a subset of
document vectors and the received queries.
3. Then, For each query, a process calls the Similarity function to assign a
similarity score to each of its documents. At the end of this step, each
document will have a score for each query.
4. The processes operate simultaneously and asynchronously. Therefore, when
a process terminates the calculations of the similarity scores, it continues
with calculating the ranks of documents. For that, for each query, each
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process calls the Sort function to assign a rank to each of its documents
compared with the documents that it treats (rather than with all documents
of the collection as is done in both multi-core based solution and GPU
based solution given that there is no shared memory between the nodes in
a computer cluster). At the end of this step, each document will have a
rank for each query.
5. After that, each process returns for each query a list of top-k documents to
the master process.
6. Whenever the master process receives the results, it calls theMerge function
to merge the results of the same query until it obtains a final list of top-k
documents for each query.
7.5 Results and comparison
We performed our experiments on "Yahoo! Answers" collection that contains
142 627 queries and 962 232 documents. We applied our techniques on the pro-
posed approach entitled "semantic searchable encryption" (SSE) that performs a
semantic search through a secure index based on the vector model (see Chapter
6). We performed several tests for each proposed technique. We realized two
kinds of experiments for each solution.
• The first experiment consists of calculating the time required for the search
process in response to a query based on the number of documents (between
50 000 and 400 000).
• The second experiment consists of calculating the time needed to perform a
search on a collection of 200 000 documents based on the number of queries
that are received simultaneously.
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In the following, we analyze the results obtained in the four proposed tech-
niques.
7.5.1 Sequential Search
First, we tested the SSE approach that works in a sequential way without any
parallelism. The experiments were performed on a computer equipped with an
Intel Xeon 2.13 GHz processor. Table 7.2 shows that the search process takes
about 32s to treat 400 000 documents in response to a single query. In addition,
concerning the second experiment, table 7.3 shows that it takes longer than 206s
to perform a sequential search on a collection of 200 000 documents in response
to 20 queries that have been received at the same time.
7.5.2 Multi-core Based Solution
We tested our first technique on a computer equipped with an Intel Xeon 2.13
GHz processor (4 cores). For the first experiment where we calculate the time
needed to perform a search based on the number of documents in response to a
single query, we tested the first solution with different numbers of threads.
Figure 7.2 shows that the multi-core based solution accelerates the search
process compared to the sequential search by reaching a speed-up around 4x.
This acceleration is justified by the distribution of the work between threads that
run simultaneously. In addition, Figure 7.4 shows that increasing the number of
threads may provide an improvement in the search performance. Therefore, it is
preferable to use a larger number of threads than the number of cores.
For the second experiment, we tested this solution using 16 threads with the
same processor. Remember that this experiment consists of calculating the time
needed to perform a search on a collection of 200 000 documents based on the
number of queries. Figure 7.3 shows that this solution brings an improvement in
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Figure 7.2: The time (ms) needed for the search process in response to a query
based on the number of documents
the search performance compared to the sequential search by achieving a speed-up
around 4x.
7.5.3 GPU Based Solution
We tested this technique on "NVIDIA Tesla C2075" graphic processor. For the
first experiment, we used a number of documents between 50 000 and 250 000
because of the limited memory space of this GPU. Figure 7.2 shows that there is
an improvement compared to the sequential search due to an acceleration around
4.5x. However, there is not any significant improvement compared to the previ-
ous solution where we have used a multi-core CPU processor. Indeed, even if a
GPU contains thousands of threads that operate simultaneously, the data trans-
mission from the CPU memory to the GPU memory takes few additional seconds
depending on the number of documents. Consequently, the time saved during
the calculation process, is wasted during the data transmission. To overcome this
problem, it is important to attribute as much as possible of work to the GPU
such as treating several queries simultaneously instead of a single query.
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Figure 7.3: The time (ms) needed to perform a search on a collection of 200,000
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Figure 7.4: Multi-core based solution tested with different number of threads
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Therefore, in the second experiment which consists in treating multiple queries
simultaneously, the GPU is expected to have a better performance given that the
threads have more work. Figure 7.3 shows that our assumption is correct given
that GPU based solution gives a better performance than both sequential solu-
tion and multi-core based solution. Indeed, GPU based solution which consists
in treating multiple queries simultaneously by a GPU achieves an acceleration
around 8.5x.
7.5.4 Hybrid Solution
We tested the third technique using a calculator equipped with an Intel Xeon
2.13 GHz processor (4 cores) and a NVIDIA Tesla C2075 graphic processor. In
the first experiment, we tested different distributions of documents between GPU
and CPU. The best performance was obtained by assigning 50% of documents
to the GPU and 50% of documents to the CPU (see Figure 7.5). However,
this distribution is not always the most optimal, since, it depends on several
criteria such as the data transmission frequency, the CPU frequency, and the
GPU frequency. Figure 7.2 shows that in the case of single query, the hybrid
solution gives a better performance than both multi-core based solution and GPU
based solution by achieving an acceleration around 5.5x.
In the second experiment, we also tested several distributions of documents
between GPU and CPU. In this case, we chose to assign the greater part of
documents to the GPU given that in the case of multiple queries, a GPU is much
faster than a CPU. Figure 7.6 shows that the best performance was obtained by
assigning 70% of documents to the GPU and 30% of documents to the CPU.
Moreover, we notice that in the case of multiple queries, the hybrid solution is
better than the two previous solutions by reaching an acceleration around 12x
(Figure 7.3).
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7.5.5 Cluster Based Solution
We tested this technique on "CERIST IBNBADIS cluster"1 which is composed of
32 compute nodes where each node is equipped with an "Intel Xeon SandyBridge"
bi-processor of 16 cores. Therefore, IBNBADIS cluster has a total of 512 cores
and a theoretical power of 8 TFLOPS.
In the first experiment, we tested several numbers of processes, namely, 8, 16,
32, 64, and 128 processes that are executed simultaneously. Figure 7.7 shows that
the best performance is achieved when we have used 16 processes. Indeed, given
that, there is no shared memory between the nodes, launching a huge number
of processes can degrade the search performance because of the large number of
lists of results returned by each process that are merged by the master process in
a sequential way. Therefore, the number of processes must be chosen so that the
search process would be distributed enough without bringing too much burden to
the master process. Figure 7.2 shows that this solution gives a better performance
than the multi-core based solution by reaching an acceleration around 4.5x.
Likewise, we also tested several numbers of processes in the second experi-
ment. Figure 7.8 shows that the best performance was achieved when we used
64 processes. In addition, Figure 7.3 shows that there is no a significant in-
crease in the computing time, even if the number of queries increases. Therefore,
this solution allows to simultaneously process a huge number of queries without
any degradation in the performance. Thus, cluster based solution gives the best
performance among all proposed solutions by achieving an acceleration around
46x. Moreover, the acceleration can be enhanced, if there are more documents or
queries to be processed.
1http://www.rx-racim.cerist.dz/?page_id=207, Feb. 2019.
96
7.5 Results and comparison
	0
	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	0 	50 	100 	150 	200 	250 	300 	350 	400
Tim
e	
(se
c)
#	of	documents	(k)
Cluster	Based	Solution	(8	processes)
Cluster	Based	Solution	(16	processes)
Cluster	Based	Solution	(32	processes)
Cluster	Based	Solution	(64	processes)
Cluster	Based	Solution	(128	processes)
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ment 2)
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7.5.6 Synthesis
The aim of this experimental study is to show the interest of the different tech-
niques that we have proposed. On one hand, the first experiment shows the
benefit of distributing the documents between multiple threads during the search
process. This experiment has validated the different solutions that we have pro-
posed by achieving accelerations around a factor of 4, 4.5, 5.5 and 4.5 for multi-
core based solution, GPU based solution, the hybrid solution, and cluster based
solution, respectively. On the other hand, the second experiment has proved the
advantage of processing multiple queries simultaneously. This new method has
improved the accelerations from 4.5x to 8.5x for GPU based solution, from 5.5x
to 12x for the hybrid solution, and from 4.5x to 46x for cluster based solution.
Moreover, if we compare the four solutions that we have proposed, we notice
that multi-core based solution is the cheapest, but it allows to achieve an acceler-
ation around 4x. This solution is useful for an individual who outsources a small
data collection, whereas, GPU based solution requires a graphic processor which
is not really expensive, in order to achieve an acceleration around 8.5x. Like-
wise, the hybrid solution exploits both CPU and GPU to achieve an acceleration
around 12x, so the hybrid solution is definitely better than GPU based solution.
Moreover, the hybrid solution is sufficient when the collection of documents is
not too big and the number of users is small. Thus, this solution is adequate
for a small company. However, the cluster solution is the most expensive, but it
achieves very good accelerations and can treat a large number of queries simul-
taneously over a large collection of documents without any degradation in the
search performance. Therefore, it is adequate for a big company.
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7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we dealt with the performance issue faced in the search over en-
crypted data. Indeed, for security and feasibility purposes, most approaches that
have been proposed in the literature opt for the choice of the vector model during
the indexing process. However, this representation causes the degradation of the
search performance since the query vector must be compared with each docu-
ment vector. To overcome this problem, we have proposed four techniques that
use some high performance computing architectures in order to accelerate any
approach based on the vector model. We have conducted an experimental study
which confirmed that the distribution of documents between different processes
as well as the processing of several queries simultaneously allow to drastically
improve the search performance.
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Chapter 8
Searchable Encryption with User
Access Rights Management
8.1 Motivation
Most of the prior approaches [5; 6; 7; 41; 56] that have been proposed in the
literature are based on the vector model. Unfortunately, approaches based on
the vector model have two major disadvantages. 1) The search process becomes
inefficient when the data collection grows considerably. Indeed, in this case, both
the number of vectors and their sizes increase, leading to a very big index table.
During the search process, the server calculates the scalar product between each
document vector and the query vector. For that, it has to load and browse
through the entire index which makes the search inefficient when the index table
is very large. 2) The update of the index is not supported when new terms appear
in the data collection which makes this kind of approach ineffective in practice.
Although the inverted index speeds up the search process through a direct
access to documents containing the query terms, it remains largely unexplored in
the literature because of its vulnerability. Indeed, an inverted index is constructed
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such that each term appearing in the collection points to the set of documents
that contain it. Unfortunately, this structure offers an adversary the relationship
between a set of terms and a given document. Consequently, the keyword privacy
constraint1 is not respected which may cause sensitive information leakage.
The first aim of this work is to propose a new construction of a secure inverted
index by exploiting and proposing several techniques such as homomorphic en-
cryption, the dummy documents technique, the compressed table technique, and
the double score formula. The second aim of this work is to take into considera-
tion the users’ access rights to the data. For this purpose, it is necessary to apply
an access control policy that enables the data owner to grant or revoke access for
any data to any user.
In the rest of the chapter, we first present the problem formulation. After
that, we explain our proposed solution, and we finish by a detailed experimental
study.
8.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we present the challenges that we have to overcome.
8.2.1 Index Structure
When using the vector model, each document (resp. query) is represented by a
vector of size2 n. The jth field of the vector contains the weight of the term j of the
dictionary3 in the document (resp. query). This weight is equal to zero in the case
where the term does not belong to the document (resp. query). All vectors are
1The scheme must be able to prevent an attacker from making a link between a set of terms
and a document.
2n is the number of terms in the data collection.
3A dictionary contains all terms of the data collection.
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encrypted using an appropriate encryption method. Unlike the inverted index, the
vector representation prevents the server from making any link between a set of
terms and a document (resp. query). Therefore, the keyword privacy constraint
is respected. In addition to the security aspect, this model is quite simple to
implement. indeed, during the search process, the cloud server calculates the
scalar product between each document vector and the query vector, sorts the
scores, and returns the top-k documents to the user. However, the drawback
is that any approach based on the vector model is a time consuming process,
given that the server must load and browse through the entire index during the
search process. The other disadvantage of using the vector model is its inability
to manage the data update, since each vector of the index has a size equal to
the number of terms in the data collection and the same goes for the trapdoors.
Thus, when new terms appear in the data collection, the document vectors as
well as the trapdoors must be recalculated and re-encrypted. Consequently, the
search process will be inefficient and impractical.
Some approaches [40; 61; 64] have tried to exploit an inverted index to speed
up the search process. The drawback of using an inverted index in a search-
able encryption approach is the difficulty of respecting some security constraints
such as the keyword privacy. Indeed, unlike the vector model, the inverted index
structure does not hide the relationship between terms and documents even after
encryption. This lack of security is explained by the fact that each entry of the
inverted index corresponds to a term in the data collection, and each entry leads
to a set of documents that contain this term. Thus, it is easy for an adversary
to link between a set of terms and a document. This drawback explains the little
use of the inverted index in the searchable encryption area despite that it is the
most appropriate way to perform an effective search. Thus, the aim of this work
is to overcome the issues encountered when using an inverted index, with parti-
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cular focus on the security aspect. For this purpose, we exploit a homomorphic
encryption cryptosystem [94] to encrypt the scores of the index. Homomorphic
encryption enables performing calculations using encrypted data without any
need of decryption in order to obtain an encrypted result. This property is very
useful in the searchable encryption area since it protects the scores and the ob-
tained results. However, even if homomorphic encryption protects the scores of
the index, it is still not sufficient to ensure the index security because of its inabil-
ity to hide the relationship between terms and documents, which makes it easy
for an adversary to deduce whether a term belongs to a given document. There-
fore, in order to enhance the index security, we took inspiration from the work of
"Cao et al." [5] to propose a technique that allows to respect the keyword privacy
constraint by preventing adversaries from deducing whether a term belongs to a
given document. We call our technique the dummy documents technique. This
technique consists in adding randomly selected document IDs to each entry of
the index and assigning each of them (the document IDs) a score zero encrypted
using homomorphic encryption. The number of dummy documents depends on
the system security level. However, the techniques that are used in our approach,
namely, homomorphic encryption and the dummy documents technique present
some drawbacks that have to be overcome.
On one hand, homomorphic encryption generates very large ciphertexts that
are 3 orders of magnitude larger than the plaintext size. Consequently, the en-
crypted index will be very large and heavy to manage which may cause the system
slow-down. To overcome this problem we propose a technique that we call the
compressed table of encrypted scores. This technique consists in limiting the
number of scores within a given interval, for instance, integers from zero to one
hundred. After that, each score is encrypted a number of times using homomor-
phic encryption and each ciphertext is represented by an ID. These IDs are used
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within the inverted index instead of using ciphertexts. In addition, a table con-
taining all ciphertexts with their corresponding IDs is outsourced with the index
in order to enable the cloud server to do the necessary calculations during the
search process. This technique considerably reduces the number of ciphertexts,
which enables compressing the encrypted index. However, in practice, it is im-
portant to pay attention to the score distribution. For example, given that some
dummy documents are added to the index, score zero will be the most frequently
used among all the scores present in the index. Thus, if an adversary notices that
some ciphertexts are more repeated than others, it can easily conclude that they
represent the encryption of zero. To correct this security breach, we propose a
formula that allows to assign each score an appropriate number of ciphertexts so
that all ciphertexts are used equitably.
On the other hand, the use of homomorphic encryption cryptosystem involves
that the similarity scores obtained during the search process are encrypted which
disables the server’s ability to sort the results. Consequently, the server returns
to the user the documents that contain at least one query term instead of return-
ing a list of top-k documents. In addition, the use of dummy documents causes
some false positives. Since the similarity scores are encrypted, the irrelevant doc-
uments cannot be filtered by the server. Thus, to allow the server to return top-k
documents and to discard a great part of irrelevant documents, we use the double
score weighting (DSW) formula (see Subsection 6.3.2) which requires the use of
an ontology such as Wikipedia that maps between terms and concepts. Notice
that the entries of the inverted index in our proposal correspond to concepts in-
stead of terms. DSW formula consists in assigning two scores to each document,
a primary score and a secondary score. The primary score represents the number
of terms in the document that are associated with the concept corresponding
to the entry, whereas, the secondary score is calculated by applying the TFIDF
104
8.2 Problem Formulation
formula. Both primary and secondary scores are encrypted using homomorphic
encryption. When building the trapdoor, the user’s query will be represented by
a set of concepts. During the search process, the server chooses the documents
appearing the most frequently in the selected entries of the index (i.e. the docu-
ments that contain the greatest number of concepts in common with the query).
Finally, after the decryption of scores in the user side, the documents will be
sorted based on their primary scores, then on their secondary scores in the case
of equality. Therefore, DSW formula filters a great part of irrelevant documents
even if their similarity scores are encrypted. Still, some irrelevant documents
may be returned to the user. Fortunately, it is easy to filter them given that their
similarity scores are equal to zero after decryption.
The purpose of this subsection is to present our motivations of proposing and
using some techniques such as the inverted index, homomorphic encryption, the
dummy documents technique, the compressed table of encrypted scores technique,
and the double score weighting formula. In Section 8.3, we explain in more
detail our proposed approach and the techniques that we have presented in this
subsection.
8.2.2 User Access Rights
Cloud computing is a technology that allows a data owner to store his data in
a remote server and share the outsourced data with other users. However, it
happens that the data owner does not want to grant the same access rights to
all users. In this case, it is necessary to apply an access control policy. For that,
CP-ABE method was proposed [78].
However, even if the CP-ABE method allows to apply an access policy on
encrypted data while protecting the data privacy, another problem arises when a
user performs a search on the data collection. The issue is that the cloud server
105
8.2 Problem Formulation
cannot recognize which documents the user has the right to access, since the
access structure is encrypted and stored in the ciphertext and the attributes are
included in the user’s private key. Therefore, during the search process, the cloud
server is forced to take into consideration the entire data collection rather than the
part of data which is accessible by the user. This has the drawback of returning
a large number of documents that the user cannot decrypt. "Bouabana-Tebibel
and Kaci" [79] tried to solve this problem by sending the encrypted private key
with the trapdoor to the cloud so that the server can identify the documents
that are accessible by the user and hence, be able to perform the search on
this dataset. Unfortunately, this method is not secure given that it is risky to
send the private key to the cloud server which is considered as semi-trusted1.
To solve this problem, we propose a method that exploits an additional secure
index. The role of this additional index is to reduce the search space to keep
only the documents which are accessible by the user, in addition to some dummy
documents2 that enhance the security. A great part of the dummy documents will
be discarded when applying the double score formula. The entries of this second
index correspond to the user IDs and each entry leads to the documents which are
accessible by the user in addition to some dummy documents. Each document
has a random access score between 1 and 100, whereas, each dummy document
has an access score equal to zero. The scores of both indexes are encrypted using
homomorphic encryption. These access scores will be used on the user side after
decryption to filter the dummy documents that have an access score equal to
zero.
1Honest but curious.
2The user does not have the right to access these documents.
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8.3 Proposed Scheme
As explained above, one of the aims of this work is to propose a secure inverted
index dedicated to the search over encrypted cloud data. The use of an inverted
index is an appropriate way to perform a search because it enables a direct access
to the relevant documents. However, it is essential to secure this index before
using it in order to protect the data privacy and prevent any sensitive information
leakage. In this section, we give a detailed explanation of the proposed approach.
For this purpose, we start by presenting an overview of our approach called "se-
cure inverted index based searchable encryption" (SIIS). Then, we explain step
by step the construction of the proposed secure inverted index. After that, we
present a new method that enables to manage the users’ access rights to the data
by exploiting a second secure inverted index. Finally, we present other details of
the proposed scheme.
8.3.1 Overview of the Proposed Approach (SIIS)
The aim of our work is to propose a semantic search approach on encrypted data
that should be practical and secure. For this purpose, we have exploited the
inverted index which is rarely used in the literature because of its vulnerability.
In order to enhance its security, we have opted for the use of few techniques such
as homomorphic encryption and the dummy documents technique. Indeed, in our
proposal, before outsourcing documents, the data owner builds a concept based
inverted index using the Wikipedia ontology. Then, some random documents
are added to each entry of the index and a weight equal to zero is associated
to each of these documents. After that, a second inverted index is constructed
in order to manage the users’ access rights to the data collection. The entries
of this second index correspond to the user IDs and each entry leads to a set
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of documents that the user has the right to access, in addition to some dummy
documents that enhance the index security. Both indexes are then encrypted
using homomorphic encryption, whereas, the data collection is encrypted using
the CP-ABE method which guarantees the access policy applied by the data
owner. Then, the encrypted data collection as well as the two secure indexes
are sent to the cloud server. Finally, the data owner constructs a set of public
keys whose role is to build trapdoors, and private keys for decrypting documents.
These keys will be shared with authorized users. To perform a search, a user
starts by formulating a query, builds a trapdoor using a public key, and sends the
trapdoor to the cloud server. Upon receiving the trapdoor, the cloud utilizes the
first index to retrieve the relevant documents and simultaneously, it exploits the
second index to get the list of documents that the user has the right to access.
After that, it keeps the documents belonging to both lists before applying the
double score formula to obtain the top-k documents that will be returned to the
user. Finally, the returned results will be decrypted, filtered, and sorted at the
user side via a trusted authority (Figure 8.1).
8.3.2 Construction of a Secure Inverted Index
In this subsection we present the four techniques necessary for the construction
of a secure inverted index I1 from the original unencrypted index I.
8.3.2.1 Homomorphic Encryption to Encrypt the Index
The leveled homomorphic encryption [94] (see Subsection 5.4.5) is an encryption
method with the particularity of enabling the calculations on ciphertexts without
any need of decryption in order to obtain an encrypted result. This feature is
very useful in our case since it allows the data owner to encrypt the scores of the
inverted index while enabling the cloud server to exploit these scores during the
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Figure 8.1: General architecture of SIIS approach
search process. However, the drawback of this method is that it produces very
large ciphertexts that exceed thousands of times the size of the corresponding
plaintext, resulting in a heavy index which can cause performance issues during
the search and the update processes. To solve this problem, we propose the
compressed table of encrypted scores technique.
8.3.2.2 Compressed Table of Encrypted Scores
The aim of this technique is to reduce the inverted index size in order to make
it more practical and easily exploitable. This technique is summarized in the
following steps (Figure 8.2).
1. First, before the encryption step and during the indexing process, the scores
of documents in the inverted index are limited in a finite interval Inv. For
instance, Inv corresponds to positive integers from zero to one hundred
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Scores Cipher-texts 
2 HE15 HE7 HE10 
3 HE18 HE2 HE4 
4 HE14 HE16 HE12 
5 HE9 HE5 HE8 
0 HE3 HE6 HE1 HE11 HE13 HE17 
0 C5 C9 C3 C16 C15 C11 
Cipher ID Cipher ID 
HE1 C3 HE10 C10 
HE2 C17 HE11 C16 
HE3 C5 HE12 C6 
HE4 C18 HE13 C15 
HE5 C1 HE14 C8 
HE6 C9 HE15 C14 
HE7 C7 HE16 C2 
HE8 C13 HE17 C11 
HE9 C4 HE18 C12 
Score Cipher-text IDs 
2 C14 C7 C10 
3 C12 C17 C18 
4 C8 C2 C6 
5 C4 C1 C13 
T1 
T2 
D1, 2.2 D3, 4.1 D5, 1.6 
D5, 2.5 D2, 5.1 
T1 
T2 
D1, 2 D3, 4 D5, 2 
D5, 3 D2, 5 
T1 
T2 
D1, C7 D3, C8 D5, C10 
D5, C18 D2, C4 
        Indexing process 
Limiting the scores in a finite interval (step 1) 
Encrypting the index using table 1 (step 4) 
Encrypting each score of the interval (step 2) 
Assigning an ID to each 
ciphertext (step 3) 
Table 2 
Table 1 
Construction of table 1 
(step 3) 
T1 
T2 
D2, C9 D3, C8 D5, C10 
D5, C18 D3, C3 
D4, C5 D1, C7 
D2, C4 D4, C11 
Applying dummy documents technique 
T: Term        
D: Document 
 
Figure 8.2: The compressed table of encrypted scores and the dummy documents
techniques.
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(Inv = [0, 100]).
2. Then, for each score of the interval Inv, some corresponding ciphertexts are
produced using the leveled homomorphic encryption method, for example,
producing of one thousand ciphertexts for the score zero, one hundred ci-
phertexts for the score one, one hundred ciphertexts for the score two, and
so on. However, for security reasons, a large number of dummy documents
having a weight equal to zero are injected into the inverted index. The num-
ber of ciphertexts corresponding to zero must be chosen appropriately in
order to be hidden (the ciphertexts corresponding to zero) among the other
ciphertexts. For this purpose, we have proposed a formula that enables to
efficiently find the appropriate number of ciphertexts corresponding to zero
(Formula 8.1).
NC0 =
NC ×NS
2
× K
10
(8.1)
Where NC0 is the number of ciphertexts corresponding to zero, NC (chosen
by the data owner) is the number of ciphertexts corresponding to any other
score, NS is the number of scores belonging to the interval Inv (NS is
equal to 101 if Inv = [0, 100]), K (also chosen by the data owner) is a
security parameter belonging to the interval [1, 10] and such that K = 10
corresponds to the highest security level.
When the security parameter is equal to 10, then, the number of ciphertexts
corresponding to zero is equal to half of the number of ciphertexts corre-
sponding to the remaining scores. This formula is based on Formula 8.2 in
which the number of dummy documents when K is equal to 10 is roughly
equal to half of documents in the index. The Formula 8.2 is presented in
the next subsection.
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3. After that, a unique identifier is assigned to each ciphertext produced in
the previous step. Then, a table T1 containing all scores of the interval
Inv is constructed, where each score is associated with its corresponding
ciphertexts represented by their identifiers. This table will be used by the
data owner when encrypting the inverted index.
4. During the encryption of the inverted index, each score1 Si will be replaced
by the identifier of a corresponding ciphertext Cj by using the table T1. The
ciphertext Cj is randomly chosen among the set of ciphertexts corresponding
to the score Si.
5. Finally, a second table T2 containing all ciphertexts produced with their
associated identifiers is constructed. The table T2 will be used by the cloud
server during the search process, whereas, the table T1 is encrypted (using
AES) and stored in the data owner side.
8.3.2.3 Dummy Documents Technique
The hardest hurdle of using an inverted index in a search approach on encrypted
cloud data is the security aspect. To overcome this problem, we have tried to
exploit homomorphic encryption. However, even by encrypting the index scores,
it is still very easy for an attacker to deduce the relationship between a set of
terms and a document. In fact, the inverted index structure is made so that each
entry of the index (concept) leads to the set of documents containing that concept.
Therefore, the keyword privacy constraint is not respected. In spite of the use of
the concept identifiers (resp. document identifiers) in the inverted index rather
than the concepts themselves (resp. document titles), the inverted index remains
vulnerable if no further improvements are made. To solve this problem, we took
1Two scores (a primary and a secondary score) are assigned to each document of the index
I1 as explained in Subsection 6.3.2.
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inspiration from a technique proposed by "Cao et al." [5] which consists in adding
dummy elements to the vectors. Similarly, our technique consists in adding for
each entry of the index some documents not containing the concept corresponding
to that entry. Then, a score zero is assigned to each dummy document. These
scores are encrypted using the table T1 (last step of Figure 8.2). The number of
dummy documents added to an entry Ei is calculated by the following formula.
DDNi =
DNi ×Random(1, 10×K)
100
(8.2)
Where DDNi is the number of dummy documents to be added, DNi is the
number of documents in the entry Ei, K is a security parameter belonging to the
interval [1, 10] and such that K = 10 corresponds to the highest security level.
Finally, Random(X, Y ) is a function that returns a random value belonging to
the interval [X, Y ].
8.3.2.4 Double Score Formula
Even if the dummy documents technique enhances the index security by respect-
ing the keyword privacy constraint, it has the drawback of causing many false
positives in the search results. Indeed, during the search process, the dummy
documents belonging to the selected entries of the index cannot be filtered by the
cloud server and will be returned to the user. Furthermore, the similarity scores
between documents and queries are encrypted due to the use of homomorphic
encryption. Consequently, the cloud server cannot sort the selected documents
and hence, it is forced to return every document belonging to the selected entries
rather than returning top-k documents. To overcome these two problems, we
took inspiration from the DSW formula that we have proposed in Chapter 6 (see
Subsection 6.3.2). The search process when applying the double score formula is
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accomplished as follows.
1. Upon receiving the encrypted query Q, the cloud server selects the entries
of the index corresponding to the concepts of the query Q.
2. After that, the cloud server classifies the selected documents into categories.
A document D belongs to a category Gi if it appears in i different selected
entries of the index.
3. Then, it selects k documents belonging to the highest categories1, calculates
the similarity scores by applying Formula 8.3, and returns the identifiers of
the selected documents as well as their encrypted scores to the user.
4. Once the user receives the search result, he decrypts the similarity scores.
Then, he discards any dummy document that has a score equal to zero.
Finally, he sorts the remaining documents based on their primary scores
and then on their secondary scores in the case of equality.
The experimental study that we have conducted shows that it is unlikely that
the same dummy document appears in several selected entries, for this reason that
the double score formula is able to ignore a great number of dummy documents.
Di(xi, yi) =
∑
Cj∈Ej∧Cj∈Q
(CPj ×DPij, CSj ×DSij) (8.3)
Where Di is the document number i, Cj is the concept number j, Ej is the
jth entry of the index, Q is the encrypted query, CPj (resp. CSj) is the primary
(resp. secondary) score of the concept Cj in the query Q, DPij (resp. DSij)
is the primary (resp. secondary) score of the concept Cj in the document Di.
Finally, xi (resp. yi) is the primary (resp. secondary) similarity score between
the document Di and the query Q. Notice that the scores DPij and DSij are
1A category Gi+1 is higher than a category Gi.
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obtained from the index I1, and the scores CPj And CSj are obtained from the
trapdoor Q.
8.3.3 User Access Rights
The second goal of our approach is to apply an access control to the data col-
lection. In fact, the data owner must be able to grant the access for a given
document to a set of users and to revoke the access to others. However, this fea-
ture should not cause any lack of security and must be done in complete safety.
For this purpose, we have exploited two techniques. The first one is CP-ABE
[78] which is used to encrypt the data collection, whereas, the second technique
consists in using a second secure inverted index I2 to filter the documents that
the user does not have the right to access in order to perform the search only on
the accessible documents.
8.3.3.1 CP-ABE to Encrypt the Data
We decided to use CP-ABE method to allow the data owner to grant or revoke the
access to a given document for any user. Furthermore, this encryption method is
an additional security layer that protects the data collection in case a document
is returned to an unauthorized user. Indeed, the data collection is stored at the
cloud side and hence, during the search process, the cloud is supposed to search
only on the dataset that the user is allowed to access. Unfortunately, there are
cases where the server returns documents that the user does not have the right
to access. Therefore, the CP-ABE method guarantees the data protection and
hence, the documents can be decrypted only by authorized users.
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8.3.3.2 Use of a Second Secure Inverted Index
The second technique consists in using a second inverted index I2 whose entries
correspond to the identifiers of users that point to the set of documents accessible
by the corresponding user. The remainder of the index will be constructed as
follows.
1. First, a random access score1 between 1 and 100 is assigned to each docu-
ment of the index I2.
2. Then, for each entry of the index I2, some dummy documents are added.
Each dummy document has an access score equal to zero. The number of
dummy documents is calculated by applying Formula 8.2.
3. Finally, the table T1 is used to encrypt each access score by randomly choos-
ing a ciphertext of the corresponding score. Notice that it is the identifier
that will be used rather than the ciphertext itself as explained in Subsection
8.3.2.2.
During the search process, both indexes I1 and I2 are used simultaneously.
The first index returns relevant documents with some false positives for security
purpose. The second index returns the documents that the user has the right
to access with some false positives. Then, the server gets the intersection of the
two results in order to obtain a list of relevant documents accessible by the user
with some false positives. After that, the server applies the double score formula
as explained in Subsection 8.3.2.4 in order to keep the top-k documents and
ignore a large part of the false positives. Upon receiving the list of results, the
data user decrypts the scores. Then, any dummy document that has a similarity
score2 equal to zero will be discarded. Similarly, any document having an access
1The scores of the index I2 are called access scores.
2The similarity scores are obtained from the index I1.
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score equal to zero will be discarded since it is a document that the user cannot
decrypt. The remaining documents will be sorted according to their similarity
scores. Notice that our experimental study shows that there are very few dummy
documents which are returned by the server.
8.3.4 Access Pattern Hiding
Most approaches that have been proposed in the literature do not hide from the
server the returned results and the selected documents. This negligence allows
the server to deduce some valuable information during its statistical analyses by
linking the trapdoor or the selected entries of the index to the set of documents
satisfying the user’s need which is inconsistent with the access pattern constraint
(see Subsection 4.3.1). Unfortunately, this lack of security may cause sensitive
information leakage as demonstrated by "Islam et al." [45].
Therefore, to prevent the server from inferring any information about the
inverted index, we propose a technique able to obtain documents securely by
preventing any attacker from knowing neither about the search result nor about
the chosen documents. This technique that we call the "access pattern hiding"
(APH) is an improvement of an existing technique called "blind storage" [109]
which consists in splitting each document into several blocks in order to prevent
the server from knowing the number of documents or distinguishing between
them. The proposed technique is a combination of the following four solutions.
8.3.4.1 Separating Technique
This technique aims to break any link between the index and the data collection
in the cloud side. For this purpose, each document ID in the index should be
different from that identifying the same document in the data collection (Figure
8.3). Consequently, the correspondence between the index and the data collection
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Figure 8.3: The separating technique: there is no link between the index and the
data collection in the cloud side.
Data ID Document ID
Doc12 D3
Doc18 D1
Doc27 D2
Table 8.1: The correspondence table linking between data IDs and documents
IDs (example of Figure 8.3).
should be done in the user side. The separating technique is performed as follows:
1. Before the indexing process, two identifiers called "document ID" and "data
ID" are affected to each document of the data collection. The data IDs are
used to represent the encrypted documents of the data collection, whereas,
the document IDs are used to represent the documents in the index. The
relationship between a data ID and a document ID can be revealed using a
table stored in the user side (Table 8.1).
2. When receiving a search result, the "correspondence table" is exploited in
the user side to link between the document IDs that have been returned by
the cloud and the data IDs. The latter are used to request the necessary
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documents stored in the cloud server.
The separating technique is able to prevent the server from making links
between the data collection and the index as long as no search has been done.
However, after few searches, the server can easily deduce the relationship between
some document IDs and data IDs. Let us take the example of Figure 8.3 and
suppose that after a first search, the server returns a list of results R1 = {d1, d3}
and the user requests the document Doc18. Then, after a second search, the
server returns a list R2 = {d1, d2} and the user requests again the document
Doc18. Therefore, the server can easily deduce that the data ID Doc18 in the
collection corresponds to the document ID D1 in the index. To overcome this
vulnerability, we propose a second technique called the "splitting technique".
8.3.4.2 Splitting Technique
This technique consists in splitting each document into several blocks to avoid the
server from distinguishing between the documents of the data collection. Then,
in order to make the server task even more complicated, we propose to generate
during the encryption process several versions of each block (Figure 8.4). To
request a document, only one version of each block is randomly chosen in the user
side. Consequently, different blocks are requested by the data users for different
accesses to the same document. The number of versions should be chosen by the
data owner before the encryption process. The splitting technique is done in the
data owner side as follows.
1. The data owner starts by choosing the block size S (for example, S = 4kb
for each block), and a parameter V (for example, V = 10) that corresponds
to the number of versions of each block.
2. Then, each document of the data collection is split into several blocks of
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Document ID Block ID Rank
D1
B5 1
B3 2
B10 3
D2
B1 1
B4 2
B8 3
D3
B7 1
B2 2
B9 3
B6 4
Table 8.2: The table of blocks (TB) which is generated from the example of
Figure (8.4).
Block ID Version ID Block ID Version ID
B5
V5
B3
V12
V11 V3
V27 V19
B10
V9
B1
V2
V15 V30
V25 V24
B4
V20
B8
V21
V18 V14
V13 V23
B7
V22
B2
V6
V1 V29
V16 V28
B9
V7
B6
V17
V8 V4
V10 V26
Table 8.3: The table of versions (TV) which is generated from the example of
Figure (8.4).
120
8.3 Proposed Scheme
Figure 8.4: Splitting of three documents into several blocks encrypted in different
versions.
size S. A rank ri is affected to each block bi to indicate its position when
merging back the blocks.
3. After that, each block bi is encrypted several times1 to obtain different
versions {vi1, vi2, vi3, ...}. The number of versions is equal to the parameter
V .
4. Then, the data owner generates two tables. The first one that we call the
table of blocks (TB) (Table 8.2) associates each document to its different
blocks with their associated ranks, whereas, the second one that we call
the table of versions (TV) (Table 8.3) associates each block to its different
encrypted versions. Note that the different versions of the same block have
the same rank. Both tables are encrypted and stored in the user side.
1The initialization vector (IV) should be different at each new encryption to obtain different
ciphertexts.
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5. To request a document, different set of blocks are selected for each new
access to the document which prevents the server from knowing either the
same document has been accessed.
This technique is able to prevent the server from making links between the
data collection and the index as long as the number of accesses to a given doc-
ument d does not exceed a security threshold θ1(d). The latter varies from one
document to another and is calculated by the following formula:
θ1(d) = V
β(d) (8.4)
Where d is a document, θ1(d) is the security threshold of the document d,
β(d) is the number of unencrypted blocks constituting the document d and V is
a parameter indicating the number of versions of each block.
Let us take the example of Figure 8.4 and suppose that after a first search,
the server returns a list of results R1 = {d1, d3} and the user requests the blocks
{v5, v3, v9} (document d1). Then, after a second search, the server returns a list
R2 = {d1, d2} and the user requests the blocks {v11, v19, v25} (document d1) and so
on until the 27th search1 (we suppose that after every search, the user requests the
document d1). During the 28th search, let us suppose that the server returns the
list R28 = {d1, d2} and the user requests the blocks {v5, v3, v9}. In this case, the
server can easily conclude that the blocks {v5, v3, v9} correspond to the document
d1.
Therefore, the document identity becomes vulnerable after being accessed a
number of times higher than the security threshold. To overcome this problem,
we propose an additional solution that we call the scrambling technique.
1Given that the document is split into 3 blocks and V is equal to 3, therefore, θ1(d1) =
33 = 27.
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Figure 8.5: The scrambling technique: dummy blocks are added before requesting
the server.
8.3.4.3 Scrambling Technique
This technique consists in requesting the server other blocks that we call the
"dummy blocks" in addition to those constituting the wanted document (Figure
8.5). The aim of these blocks is to add noise and confuse the issue in order to
prevent the server from making a link between the true blocks and the corre-
sponding document. The "scrambling technique" is performed in the user side as
follows.
1. A parameter λ is randomly chosen from an interval ]x, y] in order to de-
termine the number of dummy blocks Ndb(d) which is calculated by the
following formula:
Ndb(d) = λ× β(d) (8.5)
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Where β(d) is the number of blocks composing the wanted document d, the
interval ]x, y] is set by the data owner.
2. To obtain a document d, the authorized user has to request the encrypted
blocks constituting this document. Furthermore, additional dummy blocks
are also requested in order to add noise and prevent the server from knowing
whether a requested block is a part of those composing the wanted docu-
ment. The dummy blocks are randomly chosen from all blocks of the data
collection and their number is calculated by applying Formula (8.5).
3. Finally, after receiving the requested blocks, the dummy ones are dropped,
whereas, the true blocks are decrypted and merged in order to recover the
wanted document that has been sent to the user.
Let us take again the example of Figure 8.4 and suppose that after a first
search, the server returns a list of results R1 = {d1, d3} and the user requests
the blocks {v5, v3, v9, v2, v30, v19} (in this example, the first three blocks are true
and the rest are dummy). Then, after a second search, the server returns a list
R2 = {d1, d2} and the user requests the blocks {v11, v19, v25, v15, v26, v27} and so
on until the 27th search (we suppose that the user always requests the document
d1). During the 28th search, let us suppose that the server returns the list R28 =
{d1, d2} and the user requests the blocks {v5, v3, v9, v21, v4, v29}. In this case, the
server can conclude that the blocks E = {v5, v3, v9} correspond probably to the
document d1 with a probability Pk, where Pk is the probability that at most k
blocks can constitute a document (in this example k is equal to 3 blocks). After
a while, if the server does not find any set of blocks that appears at least twice
and includes E, it can conclude that the blocks {v5, v3, v9} correspond to the
document d1. Therefore, the identity of documents is protected as long as the
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threshold θ2(d) is not exceeded.
θ2(d) = A× θ(d) (8.6)
Where A ∈ N>1 and it increases when β(d) or/and Ndb(d) increase.
This example shows that the scrambling technique is able to prevent the
server from linking a set of blocks E to a document d even if the threshold
θ1(d) is exceeded. However, even though this technique complicates the server
task to disclose the access pattern, it cannot permanently hide the identity of
the documents frequently accessed. To achieve this, we propose an additional
solution that we call the "grouping technique".
8.3.4.4 Grouping Technique
The dummy blocks are randomly selected from the whole blocks constituting
the data collection, which explains the fact that there is almost no repeat when
requesting them. Contrary to the true blocks that are repeated after the threshold
θ1(d) is exceeded. Therefore, after requesting a document several times1, the
server would be able to distinguish the true blocks from the dummy ones (see
Subsection 8.3.4.3). To overcome this security breach, our idea is to divide the
blocks constituting the data collection into several groups. When requesting the
blocks of a document, the dummy ones are selected from the same groups of the
true blocks. This technique allows to repeat a certain number of dummy blocks
which avoids the attacker from distinguishing between the true blocks and the
dummy ones. The grouping technique is performed as follows:
1. The blocks constituting the data collection are divided into several groups.
Two blocks of the same document should not appear in the same group.
1A number of time much more than the threshold θ1(d).
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The blocks should have the same size Sz, where:
Sz > y + 1 (8.7)
With y is the parameter of the interval ]x, y] that have been used in the
scrambling technique (see Subsection 8.3.4.3).
2. During the scrambling technique, after the number of dummy blocks Ndb(d)
is calculated, the dummy blocks are selected from the groups to which the
true blocks belong. For example, if the user wants to request three true
blocks belonging to the groups A, B, and C, respectively. If the number
of dummy blocks calculated by Formula 8.5 is equal to six. Therefore, two
dummy blocks should be randomly selected from the group A, two dummy
blocks should be selected from the group B, and two dummy blocks should
be selected from the group C.
To show the benefits of the grouping technique, we take the example of Figure
8.4. First, we suppose that the grouping is made as shown in Table 8.4. Now, Let
us suppose that after a first search, the server returns a list of results R1 = {d1, d3}
and the user requests the blocks {v5, v3, v9, v21, v28, v32} (in this example, the first
three blocks are true and the rest are dummy blocks belonging to the same groups
as the first three blocks). Then, after a second search, the server returns a list
R2 = {d1, d2} and the user requests the blocks {v11, v19, v25, v4, v33, v29} and so on
until the 27th search (the user always requests the document d1). During the 28th
search, let us suppose that the server returns the list R28 = {d1, d2} and the user
requests the blocks {v5, v3, v9, v21, v28, v13}. Given that some dummy blocks are
repeated with the true blocks, the server task becomes more difficult to disclose
the document identity. Therefore, the identities of documents are protected as
long as the threshold θ3(d) is not exceeded.
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Group ID Blocks Group ID Blocks
G1 V5, V21, V7 G2 V23, V10, V35
G3 V11, V20, V4 G4 V24, V6, V26
G5 V16, V12, V36 G6 V19, V1, V33
G7 V15, V2, V17 G8 V27, V8, V34
G9 V18, V22, V31 G10 V25, V30, V29
G11 V3, V14, V28 G12 V9, V13, V32
Table 8.4: The grouping table (example of Figure 8.4).
θ3(d) = B × θ2(d) (8.8)
Where B ∈ Q>1 and it increases when β(d), Ndb(d) and/or Sz increase.
8.3.4.5 Aggregation
The APH technique is the aggregation of the four proposed methods previously
introduced, namely, the separating technique, the splitting technique, the scram-
bling technique, and the grouping technique. The APH technique allows to
keep the SE scheme respecting the access pattern constraint when requesting
the needed documents after a search. In the following we explain how to exploit
the APH technique.
1. Before the encryption of the data collection, the data owner applies the
splitting technique. For that, each document is split into several blocs of
size S. A rank ri is attributed to each block bi in order to keep the ability
to reconstruct the document later. Finally, the data owner generates the
table of blocks (TB) to link between a document and its different blocks
with their associated ranks.
2. After that, each block is encrypted into several versions. The number of
versions is equal to the parameter V chosen by the data owner. The latter
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constructs the table of versions (TV ) in order to link between a block and
its different encrypted versions. Finally, the table of blocks and the table of
versions are encrypted and stored in the user side (internal server), whereas,
the encrypted blocks are outsourced to the cloud server.
3. Then, the data owner applies the grouping technique. For that, he chooses
the interval ]x, y] and uses the parameter y in order to calculate the size of
the groups (Sz) by applying Formula 8.7. After that, he divides the blocks
into several groups of size Sz. The groups should have the same size and
the blocks of the same document should appear in different groups.
4. During the indexing process, the data owner applies the separating tech-
nique to obtain an index with document identifiers different from those of
the data collection. For that, the document IDs are used in the index,
whereas, the version IDs are used in the data collection. The correspon-
dence between the index and the data collection should be made in the user
side using both TB and TV . Finally, the index should be encrypted and
outsourced to the cloud server.
5. During the search, the data user formulates a query and encrypts it to
construct a trapdoor that is sent to the cloud server. Upon receiving the
trapdoor, the cloud server launches the search and returns a list of top-
k document IDs to the user. The latter chooses the document IDs that
he needs from the returned results and uses the table of blocks to obtain
the block IDs corresponding to the document IDs. After that, the table
of versions is also exploited to randomly obtain an encrypted version ID
corresponding to each block ID. Then, the scrambling technique is applied
to add some dummy block IDs. The dummy blocks should be selected from
the same groups as the true blocks. Finally, the dummy and the true blocks
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are requested from the server.
6. After receiving the requested blocks from the server, the dummy ones are
dropped, whereas, the true blocks are exploited to reconstruct the needed
documents. Note that the ranks of blocks stored in the table of blocks
are primordial in the reconstruction process. Finally, the documents are
decrypted and exploited by the user.
8.3.5 Functions of the SIIS Approach
The proposed scheme is composed of seven functions (KeyGen, TabGen, BuidOnto,
BuildIndexes, Trapdoor, Search, and Sort) and two main phases (Initialization
phase and Retrieval phase). We start by presenting the seven functions of the
proposed scheme.
• KeyGen. It generates a private key SKhe and a public key PKhe by exploit-
ing the leveled fully homomorphic encryption method [94]. The private key
SKhe will be used by the authorized users to decrypt the search results (the
similarity and the access scores), whereas, the public key PKhe will be used
by the data owner to construct the two tables T1 and T2 and by the users to
generate encrypted queries (trapdoors). Furthermore, a set of private keys
SKcp = {SK1cp, SK2cp, SK3cp, ..., SKncp} and a public key PKcp are generated
by exploiting the CP-ABE methode [78]. The public key PKcp will be used
by the data owner to encrypt the data collection, whereas, each private key
SKicp will be used to decrypt a part of the data collection that the user Ui
has the right to access.
• TabGen (Inv, PKhe). Steps 2, 3 and 5 of the compressed table technique
are exploited in this function to construct both tables T1 and T2. The ta-
ble T1 contains the set of scores belonging to the interval Inv used by the
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SIIS approach, where each score Si is related to a set of ciphertexts. These
ciphertexts are obtained by encrypting the score Si several times using the
public key PKhe. The initialization vector (IV ) should be different at each
new encryption to obtain different ciphertexts. This set of ciphertexts is
associated with the score Si through the table T1. Each ciphertext in the
table T1 is represented by an ID. Table T2 is used to associate ciphertexts
with their identifiers (see Figure 8.2). Table T1 will be used by the BuildIn-
dexes function to obtain an encrypted and compressed indexes, whereas,
table T2 will be exploited by the Search function when performing a search.
• BuildOnto. The proposed approach exploits an ontology built fromWikipedia
as follows. First, we suppose that every Wikipedia page corresponds to a
concept. After that, the English pages of Wikipedia are indexed such that
each page is represented by a vector of weighted terms by applying the
TFIDF formula. Finally, in order to accelerate the mapping between terms
and concepts, an inverted index Iwiki is created where each term is repre-
sented by a set of weighted concepts (see Subsection 6.3.1).
• BuildIndexes (F , T1). It constructs both indexes I1 and I2 from the data
collection F . The first index I1 is used by the cloud server during the search
process to retrieve the most relevant documents. The entries of the index
I1 correspond to the concepts of the Wikipedia ontology. Each entry Ei
leads to a set of documents containing the concept Ci in addition to some
dummy documents that are used to enhance the index security. The second
index I2 is used by the cloud server to reduce the search space to the set of
documents accessible by the user. The index I2 is constructed in the same
way with the index I1 except that the entries of the index I2 correspond to
the user IDs and each entry E ′i leads to the documents accessible by the
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user Ui in addition to some dummy documents. The scores of the index I1
called similarity scores are calculated by applying the DSW Formula (see
Subsection 6.3.2), whereas, the scores of the index I2 called access scores
are calculated as explained in Subsection 8.3.3.2. Both similarity scores
and access scores are encrypted using the table T1 (see step 4 of Subsection
8.3.2.2). Notice that it is the identifiers of ciphertexts that are used in both
indexes instead of the ciphertexts themselves.
• Trapdoor (W , PKhe). When a user formulates a query, the Wikipedia
ontology is used to map between the query terms W and a set of concepts
C. Then, each concept of the query is weighted by applying the DSW
formula. After that, a subset of concepts C ′ is randomly chosen from the
set C to represent the query1. This method of choosing the concepts is used
to ensure the query unlinkability constraint. Finally, each concept of the
query is represented by an ID and the scores of each concept are encrypted
using the leveled homomorphic encryption.
• Search (Q, I1, I2, k, Ui). Upon receiving the encrypted query Q, the cloud
server selects the entries of the index I1 that correspond to the concepts
of the query. At the same time, it selects the entry of the index I2 that
corresponds to the user Ui who launched the search. Then, the cloud server
selects the documents belonging to both the selected entries of the index I1
and the selected entry of the index I2. After that, it uses the double score
formula to keep the top-k documents (see Subsection 8.3.2.4). Finally, each
selected document is assigned three scores calculated by Formula 8.9 which
1In our experimental study we have chosen 10 concepts among the best 15 concepts repre-
senting the query.
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are then returned to the user.
Di(xi, yi, zi) =
 ∑
Cj∈Ej∧Cj∈Q
(CPj ×DPij, CSj ×DSij), DAil
 (8.9)
Where Di is the document number i, Cj is the concept number j, Ej is the
jth entry of the index I1, Q is the encrypted query, CPj (resp. CSj) is the
primary (resp. secondary) score of the concept Cj in the query Q and DPij
(resp. DSij) is the primary (resp. secondary) score of the concept Cj in
the document Di. Finally, xi (resp. yi) is the primary (resp. secondary)
similarity score between the document Di and the query Q, and zi (DAil)
is the access score of the user Ul to the document Di. Notice that the score
DAil is obtained from the index I2.
• Sort (R, SKhe). Upon receiving the search result R, the user decrypts
the scores using the private key Skhe. Then, any dummy document hav-
ing a similarity score equal to zero is ignored. Similarly, any inaccessible
document having an access score equal to zero is ignored. Finally, The
remaining documents are sorted based on their primary scores and their
secondary scores in the case of equality.
The search process consists in two main steps.
• Initialization phase. In this phase, the data owner prepares the search
environment as follows.
1. First, the KeyGen function is called to generate the different keys that
will be shared with authorized users using a secure communication
protocol.
132
8.4 Analyses and Comparison
2. Then, the BuildOnto function is called to build an ontology from
Wikipedia. This ontology will be stored in an internal server and
will be accessible by authorized users only.
3. After that, the TabGen function is called to generate both tables T1
and T2 that will be used during the construction of the index and the
search process, respectively.
4. Finally, from a data collection F , the data owner builds the secure
indexes I1 and I2 by calling the BuildIndexes function. The secure
indexes as well as the encrypted data collection1 are then sent to the
cloud server.
• Retrieval phase. In this phase, a search process is performed as follows.
1. First, an authorized user builds an encrypted query by calling the
Trapdoor function.
2. Upon receiving the encrypted query, the server launches the Search
function and returns to the user the document IDs with their corre-
sponding encrypted scores.
3. Finally, in the user side, the returned documents are filtered and sorted
using the Sort function.
8.4 Analyses and Comparison
8.4.1 Security Analyses
In order to analyse the security aspect of the SIIS scheme, we will verify whether
the security constraints presented in Subsection 4.3.2 are respected. In addition,
1The data collection is encrypted using the CP-ABE method
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we will analyse the security of the encrypted inverted index and the users’ access
rights.
• Protected content. This constraint consists in encrypting any data passing
through the cloud server, namely, the indexes, the data collections, and
the queries. Firstly, scores in both I1 and I2 indexes used in our approach
are encrypted using homomorphic encryption, whereas, concepts and docu-
ments are represented by identifiers. Secondly, a trapdoor is represented by
a set of concepts with their associated weights. Each concept is represented
by an identifier and each weight is encrypted using homomorphic encryp-
tion. Finally, the data collection is encrypted using the CP-ABE method
which allows to protect the content of documents and enables to apply an
access control policy. Conclusively, the protected content constraint is re-
spected by the proposed approach since the indexes, the data collections
and the queries are encrypted.
• Keyword privacy. This constraint consists in preventing the server from
making any link between terms and documents. For this purpose, two
properties must be hidden, namely, the term distribution and the inter-
distribution. On one hand, the inter-distribution consists in the distribu-
tion of scores of terms in a given document. This property is hidden by
homomorphic encryption which allows to encrypt the scores in the inverted
index. On the other hand, the term distribution consists in the frequen-
cies of a given term in each document of the collection. This property is
hidden through the dummy documents technique that prevents the server
from knowing whether a term belongs to the documents to which the cor-
responding entry leads. We conclude that the keyword privacy constraint
is respected in our approach.
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• Trapdoor unlinkability. This constraint consists in preventing the server
from making links between different trapdoors. For this purpose, a subset
of concepts (x concepts) is randomly chosen from the set of concepts (y
concepts) representing the query, for example, choosing 10 concepts among
the 100 concepts representing the query. Note that each concept is repre-
sented by an ID and its weight is encrypted using homomorphic encryption.
This construction allows to get Cxy different trapdoors for the same query
(Cxy =
y!
(y−x)!×x!). In the above example where x = 10 and y = 100, 1.7×1013
different trapdoors could be generated for the same query. Therefore, the
SIIS approach provides a non-deterministic encryption scheme which allows
to respect the trapdoor unlinkability constraint.
• Access pattern. This constraint consists in hiding from the server the result
returned to the user. When performing a search, a set of dummy document
identifiers is always returned with the right result. These false positives
allow to hide the correct result from the server. Furthermore, the APH
technique (see Subsection 8.3.4) allows the user to access the documents
that he needs without disclosing their identities which prevents the server
from recognizing the false positives in the search result. Therefore, the
access pattern constraint is respected in the SIIS approach.
• Index security. The index security is ensured by the use of some techniques
that enable to wrap the index in four security layers. The first technique
consists in using identifiers to represent concepts and documents. These
identifiers are used when creating the index instead of using the entitles
of concepts and documents. This technique is very simple and straight-
forward but it enables to implement a first security layer. The second
technique consists in exploiting homomorphic encryption to encrypt the
135
8.4 Analyses and Comparison
scores of documents. It enables the association degrees between concepts
and documents to be hidden. Then, the third security layer is ensured by
the dummy documents technique which consists in adding a noise to each
entry of the index in order to prevent any attacker from linking between
a concept and a document. Finally, the last security consists in the APH
technique which allows to break any link between the index and the data
collection. This feature is very important, given that it allows to respect
one of the most complicated constraints, namely, the access pattern.
• Access rights privacy. The users’ access rights are stored in a second in-
verted index. Therefore, their privacy is based on the safety of the secure
inverted index that we have proposed which is based on four security layers.
In addition, we have preferred to expand the interval of the access scores
from the set1 {0,1} to the set Inv2 containing all exploited scores. This
trick is introduced in order to protect the table of encrypted scores by pre-
venting any attacker from linking between the set {0,1} and the set of the
corresponding encrypted scores.
8.4.2 Performance Analysis
We performed our experiments on the "Yahoo! Answers"3 collection which con-
tains 142 627 queries and 962,232 documents. We carried out several experiments
in order to measure the performance of the proposed approach. The experiments
were performed on a computer equipped with an Intel Xeon 2.13 GHz proces-
sor. The prototype of the proposed approach which is available on-line4 was
1The score 1 corresponds to the access right and 0 is assigned to the dummy documents.
2Any score except 0 corresponds to the access right.
3https://answers.yahoo.com/, Feb.2019.
4https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ju2wzqa56x5c8pm/AADfFZE3POdxxr7YsHjULcx0a?dl=0,
Feb.2019.
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Figure 8.6: The size of the generated index using homomorphic encryption.
developed using the C programming language. In addition, we have used HE-
lib library1 in order to exploit the various functions of the leveled homomorphic
encryption approach. By default, the following parameters are used: top-k =
top-100; Inv = [0, 100]; NC = 10 000, where NC is the number of different ci-
phertexts generated for each score (see Subsection 8.3.2.2) and K = 10 is the
highest security level.
8.4.2.1 Size of the Encrypted Index
We have performed several experiments in order to validate the effectiveness of
the proposed approach (SIIS scheme) in compressing the encrypted index. For
this purpose, we started by measuring the size of the secure index generated in
our approach without using the compressed table of encrypted scores technique
(Figure 8.6). After that, we have carried out the same experiment using the
compressed table technique (Figure 8.7).
1https://github.com/shaih/HElib, Feb.2019.
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Figure 8.7: The size of the generated index using the compressed table of en-
crypted scores technique (NC = 1 000 and NC = 10 000 correspond to the number
of ciphertexts generated for each score).
Figure 8.6 shows that the size of the index increases considerably when creat-
ing the inverted index using homomorphic encryption. Indeed, the size increased
from 22,2 GB before encryption to 161,45 TB after encryption which corresponds
to a 7 447-fold increase.
To overcome this problem, we have proposed the compressed table of en-
crypted scores technique. Figure 8.7 shows that this technique allows to con-
siderably reduce the size of the index. In fact, the size decreases from 161,45
TB to 712,54 GB after using the compressed table technique (for each score,
10 000 corresponding ciphertexts are produced (see step 2 of Subsection 8.3.2.2
for more details)). In addition, the size of the index does not depend on the num-
ber of documents to be indexed, but depends on the security level, which allows
the data owner to choose the appropriate balance between the security and the
performance.
In order to compare the size of the encrypted index generated in the proposed
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Figure 8.8: The size of the generated index in the MRSE approach.
approach with an index generated in a method based on the vector model, we
have performed the same experiment on the MRSE approach [5] which is based
on the vector model (Figure 8.8).
Figure 8.8 shows that the encrypted index of the MRSE approach (encrypted
by the SkNN algorithm) increases linearly with the number of documents in the
data collection. Indeed, the size of the index increases from 3,5 GB before encryp-
tion to 3 427,74 GB after encryption which corresponds to a 979-fold increase.
In comparison with our proposed approach, the index increases from 22,2 GB
before encryption to 712,54 GB after encryption which corresponds to a 32-fold
increase. Moreover, in our approach, the size of the encrypted index is almost
constant even if the number of documents increases.
8.4.2.2 Relevance of Results
We have compared the proposed SIIS approach with two other approaches based
on the relevance of the returned results. The first one is a traditional approach
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Figure 8.9: Relevance of the returned results in three different approaches.
which enables performing a semantic search on an unencrypted index. The second
approach is called MRSE and is based on the vector model. The MRSE approach
allows to perform a syntactic search over an encrypted data collection (see Figure
8.9).
Unsurprisingly, the semantic search on clear data gives the best results by
reaching an accuracy of 43,46%. The relevance of results returned by our approach
is not far from those returned in the semantic search on clear data. Indeed, the
SIIS approach that performs a semantic search through a secure inverted index is
able to reach an accuracy of 38,76%. Finally, the relevance of results returned by
the MRSE method which performs a syntactic search over encrypted index based
on the vector model does not exceed 23%. This experiment clearly demonstrates
that the proposed approach enables returning a very good quality of results which
are not far in terms of accuracy from the results returned in a semantic search
on clear data.
Then, we performed a second experiment in order to test the effect of the
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dummy documents technique on the quality of the returned results. For that,
we tested the SIIS approach with the minimal security level (K = 0) so that
no dummy document is injected in the index. After that, we tested it with the
maximal security level (K = 10). Figure 8.10 shows that the number of relevant
documents decreases only shortly after the injection of dummy documents. In
fact, the accuracy decreases from 40,76% whenK is equal to 0, to 38,76% whenK
is equal to 10. The reason why the precision only decreases very shortly is due to
the use of the double score formula which enables to discard a very large number
of irrelevant documents including the dummy documents (see Figure 8.11).
Finally, to measure the effectiveness of the double score formula, we carried
out a third experiment where we tested two versions of our proposed approach.
In the first version, we have tested the SIIS approach without using the double
score formula, whereas, in the second version, the formula was exploited during
the search process. Figure 8.11 shows that the double score formula brings an
improvement in the quality of the returned results by increasing the accuracy from
22,45% to 38,76%. This improvement is justified by the ability of the double score
formula to filter a great part of irrelevant documents.
8.4.2.3 Search Time
Concerning the search time, we tried to compare our approach with the MRSE
approach which is based on the vector model. We tested our approach on the
"Yahoo! Answers" collection which contains 962 323 documents. However, we
tested the MRSE approach only on 5 000 documents due to insufficient memory
space (we could not load more than 5 000 document vectors of size equal to
409 334).
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On one hand, Figure 8.12 shows that in the MRSE approach, 402 seconds are
necessary to perform 20 sequential searches on a collection of 5 000 documents.
Note that the calculation of the similarity scores takes 84% of the search time
while sorting the documents takes the remaining time, therefore, the time required
to perform 20 consecutive searches using the MRSE approach on a collection of
962 323 documents is theoretically equal to 21,5 hours (77 371s).
On the other hand, Figure 8.13 shows that the time required to perform 20
consecutive searches on a collection of 962,323 documents using our proposed
approach is equal to 31 minutes (1 873s) which makes the SIIS approach 41 times
faster than the MRSE approach. Notice that the experiments were performed in
a sequential way without any parallelism.
Finally, we tested the search time when exploiting a second index that is
used to take into consideration the users’ access rights. This experiment was
performed on a user who has the right to access 16 documents. In addition, 8
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Figure 8.13: Time needed to perform searches on a collection of 962,323 docu-
ments using our proposed approach.
dummy documents were added to these documents after encrypting the index.
Unlike Bouabana’s approach [79] where the server verifies the documents one by
one to retrieve those that the user can access, in the SIIS approach, a second index
is exploited which enables a direct access to these documents. Figure 8.14 shows
that the use of a second index brings an improvement in the search performance
since the search space is reduced by keeping only the documents that the user
has the right to access. The time saved during the search depends on the number
of documents accessible by the user. In this experiment, we have compared two
versions of our approach. In the first one, the users’ access rights are not taken
into account, whereas, in the second version, a second index is used to take into
consideration the users’ access rights. Figure 8.14 shows that the search process
is 16 times faster when considering the access rights.
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8.5 Summary
The inverted index is barely used in the literature for security reasons and most
approaches prefer to exploit the vector model. However, the later has a lot of
drawbacks such as the slowdown of the search process, difficulty in updating data
and generating very large indexes. In order to improve the search performance
and make the search process more natural, we have proposed a method that
enables constructing a secure inverted index using several techniques such as
homomorphic encryption, the dummy documents technique, the compressed table
of encrypted scores, and the double score formula. The proposed secure inverted
index is the basis of the SIIS approach. After that, we have exploited a second
secure inverted index in order to efficiently and securely manage the users’ access
rights to the data. The experimental study that we have performed demonstrates
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the benefit of the proposed approach in terms of performance in comparison with
the approaches based on the vector model.
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Conclusions
9.1 Summary
In this thesis, we dealt with the problem of searchable encryption over encrypted
cloud data. The challenge in this research area is how to retrieve the best results
(accuracy and recall), within an acceptable time frame, while respecting the se-
curity constraints, and without causing any sensitive information leakage. Our
first contribution consists in improving the quality of the search result in terms
of recall and precision by adapting a semantic search to an encrypted environ-
ment. To make it possible, we have proposed a new weighting formula called
the double score weighting (DSW) formula. This proposal allows to considerably
improve the search accuracy and recall. In the second contribution, we improved
the scheme performance by reducing the search time. In fact, we proposed 4
techniques that allow to perform the search process in a parallel way, and to deal
with multiple queries simultaneously. Different HPC architectures are exploited
by these techniques, such as the GPU, and the computer cluster. Applying these
techniques enable to accelerate the SE scheme around a factor of forty.
Finally, our third contribution is a compromise between the quality of the re-
sults, the search performance, and the security of the scheme. First, the scheme
performance in terms of search time is guaranteed through the use of the in-
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verted index. Indeed, this index structure allows a direct access to the relevant
documents without browsing through the entire index as is done in the vector
space model which is widely used in the searchable encryption area (for security
reasons). Second, the quality of the results is ensured by the use of the semantic
search proposed in the first contribution. In fact, each entry of the inverted index
corresponds to a concept1 of Wikipedia ontology, and each concept leads to a set
of documents that contain it. Finally, two techniques were exploited to secure
the inverted index, namely, homomorphic encryption, and the dummy documents
technique. Furthermore, we have proposed two additional techniques. The first
one is used to compress the encrypted index, whereas, the second technique is
necessary to filter the false positives. In addition, we have taken advantage of
the secure inverted index, by exploiting a second index that allows to manage the
users’ access rights to the outsourced data.
9.2 Perspectives
As a perspective, we intend to take into consideration the data updates. In fact,
when some documents are updated, inserted, or removed from the data collection,
the encrypted index should be updated as well. However, the index update may
cause sensitive information leakage. To avoid this problem, two new constraints
have been proposed in the literature. The first constraint called "forward privacy"
guarantees that old queries cannot be performed on inserted documents, whereas,
the second one is called "backward privacy" and it makes sure that new queries
cannot be applied on deleted data (see Section 4.3.2). Therefore, our upcoming
goal is to adapt the SIIS approach (See Chapter 8) so that, backward privacy
and forward privacy constraints will be respected when the secure inverted index
1The concepts of Wikipedia ontology are exploited by the index instead of using the set of
terms that belong to the data collection.
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is updated.
Our second perspective consists in proposing a personalized searchable en-
cryption scheme. Indeed, our aim is to adapt the search result to the user’s
preferences, such as the languages, the document formats, and the area of inter-
est. For this purpose, we think about implicitly creating encrypted profiles for
each user by the cloud server from the search history. During the search process,
the user profile is exploited in addition to the trapdoor in order to return the
most appropriate search result. These profiles should be securely updated after
each search operation.
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